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STATISTICAL PAIRS TRADING AND ANALYST RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
Previous literature has documented statistical pairs trading with stocks yielding positive 
abnormal returns. This phenomenon violates the weak form of the efficient market 
hypothesis and cannot be explained by known risk factors. An emerging field in pairs 
trading studies focused on information flow has provided interesting results on the 
relation of statistical trading and information events, but without being able to explain 
the abnormal returns. This thesis aims to elaborate this relation by studying analyst 
recommendations which have been shown to be related to both stock price movements 
and information events, but have not been previously studied in connection to statistical 
pairs trading. 
 
DATA 
I study a daily return data of all U.S. utility sector stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX 
and NASDAQ exchanges during years 2000 to 2010. Of this sample I form 20 stock 
pairs every 6 months for statistical pairs trading. I match the 20 pairs with newly issued 
analyst recommendations during trading. The full data consists of approximately 150 
stocks forming on average 6 602 potential pairs every 6 months, and 3 126 matched 
analyst recommendations. 
 
RESULTS 
My results support previous findings that statistical pairs trading yields positive 
abnormal returns, though smaller in recent years, and that relative analyst 
recommendations hold valuable information to investors. However, I find that stock 
prices do not evidence post-recommendations drift in pairs after being issued divergent 
recommendations. 
Divergent recommendations are a signal of a statistical stock pair breaking up. The 
spread may move to the direction recommendations indicate or irrationally to the 
opposite direction and hence the direction of the spread between a pair cannot be 
inferred from recommendations. Pairs breaking up causes negative return to pairs 
trading and thus the aggregate abnormal positive return to pairs trading is driven by 
pairs that are not issued divergent recommendations. 
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TILASTOLLINEN KAUPANKÄYNTI OSAKEPAREILLA JA ANALYYTIKOIDEN 
SUOSITUKSET 
 
TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Aiemmat tutkimukset ovat osoittaneet tilastollisen kaupankäynnin osakepareilla 
tuottavan positiivisia ylituottoja. Ilmiö rikkoo tehokkaiden markkinoiden hypoteesin 
heikkoa muotoa eikä sitä ole kyetty selittämään tunnetuilla riskitekijöillä. Tutkimus 
informaation vaikutuksista osakepareilla käytävään tilastolliseen kaupankäyntiiin on 
tarjonnut mielenkiintoisia tuloksia tilastollisen kaupankäynnin ja uuden informaation 
suhteesta pystymättä kuitenkaan selittämään tilastollisen kaupankäynnin ylituottoja. 
Tämä tutkimus pyrkii laajentamaan tietämystämme tästä suhteesta tarkastelemalla 
analyytikoiden osakesuosituksia, joiden on havaittu olevan yhteydessä sekä 
osakekursseihin että uuteen markkinainformaatioon, mutta joita ei ole aiemmin tutkittu 
yhteydessä tilastolliseen kaupankäyntiin osakepareilla. 
 
LÄHDEAINEISTO 
Tutkin ilmiötä päivittäisellä tuottoaineistolla Yhdysvaltalaisista yhteiskuntahyödykkeet-
toimialan listatuista osakkeista vuosina 2000–2010. Muodostan aineistosta 20 
osakeparia puolivuosittain, joilla käyn tilastollisesti kauppaa. Näihin 20 pariin yhdistän 
kaupankäynnin aikana annetut analyytikkosuositukset. Lopullinen aineisto käsittää noin 
150 osaketta muodostaen keskimäärin 6 602 mahdollista puolivuosittain testattua 
osakeparia, ja yhteensä 3 126 analyytikkosuositusta näille pareille. 
 
TULOKSET 
Tulokseni tukevat aiempia tutkimuksia: tilastollinen kaupankäynti osakepareilla tuottaa 
positiivisia ylituottoja ja analyytikoiden suhteelliset osakesuositukset sisältävät 
arvokasta tietoa sijoittajille. Osakeparin kurssimuutokset eivät kuitenkaan seuraa 
analyytikkosuosituksia, kun suositukset osakkeille ovat eriäviä. 
Eriävät suositukset ovat signaali osakeparin hajoamisesta. Parit voivat erkaantua 
suositusten osoittamaan suuntaan tai irrationaalisesti vastakkaiseen suuntaan, joten 
hajoamisen suuntaa ei voi päätellä suositusten suunnasta. Hajoavat parit aiheuttavat 
negatiivisia tuottoja ja positiiviset ylituotot osakepareilla käytävälle tilastolliselle 
kaupankäynnille aiheutuvat pareista, joille analyytikot eivät anna eriäviä suosituksia. 
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1. Introduction 
Pairs trading as a statistical arbitrage trading strategy is a market neutral strategy commonly 
used by hedge fund managers and investment banks’ proprietary trading desks. An extensive 
group of hedge funds defines pairs trading as one of their investment strategies, which argues 
the fact that believers in abnormal profits through pairs trading are numerous. Indeed, for a 
hedge fund manager pairs trading provides many desired qualities: market neutrality, leverage 
and indifference about absolute pricing. 
 
Pairs trading is a trading strategy where a pair is formed of two assets to which a relationship 
can be estimated. As the asset prices deviate from the estimated relationship the relative loser 
is bought and the relative winner sold short in anticipation that the assets will converge back 
to the estimated relationship. When the assets converge the positions are closed and trader 
makes a profit amounting to the spread that converged between the assets. 
 
The popularity among practitioners has woken an academic research studying pairs trading. 
Most of the research is focused on the profitability of different strategies in different settings 
and trying to unfold the optimal implementation of pairs trading. One of the most studied is a 
simple statistical pairs trading strategy that Gatev, Goetzmann and Rouwenhorst (1999, 2006) 
have shown to generate excess return of up to 11% per annum by trading stock pairs. Strategy 
that generates abnormal return by exploiting solely information in past stock prices violates 
the weak form of the efficient market hypothesis. Since the publication of the first article by 
Gatev et al. in 1999 scholars have tested the simple strategy without yet to find the excess 
return being related to any known risk factors or other possible explanatory variables. 
Furthermore, several studies with recent data have found the strategy still returning abnormal 
profits. 
 
In addition to statistical arbitrage another branch within pairs trading is fundamental pricing. 
The field is based on the Law of One Price principles that assets with similar payoffs should 
be priced equally, and payoffs can be determined through fundamental information. Stock 
analysts are a large group in the profession of analyzing fundamental company data. Their 
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recommendations can be interpreted as estimates of future payoffs. An individual analyst 
giving recommendations to several securities is relatively ranking the expected performance 
of those securities. Furthermore, as analysts often monitor similar companies, their 
recommendations have an even deeper relative aspect. Yu (2011) tests this aspect and finds 
that pairs trading on individual analysts’ divergent recommendations yields abnormal positive 
return of up to 2.2% in 6 months. Yu (2011) defines divergent recommendations as two 
differing recommendations that are given to two stocks by the same analyst on the same date, 
e.g. Wall Street Journal’s all-star analyst Neil Kalton from Wells Fargo issuing a hold 
recommendation to Westar Energy and a strong buy to Scana Corporation on the 18
th
 
September 2009. 
 
Studies by Gatev et al. (2006) and Yu (2011) share a number of interesting qualities in respect 
to sample stocks, trading, excess return and market risk. The two studies make an interesting 
match to relate analyst recommendations which reflect fundamental information and strictly 
statistical stock price co-movement in a context of pairs trading. Statistical pairs trading has 
not been related to analyst recommendations earlier. In this study I provide fresh evidence on 
the relation between statistical pairs trading and analyst recommendations. My findings 
provide new information on the relative post-recommendation stock price drift between two 
stocks forming a pair and how fundamental changes between companies proxied by analysts’ 
relative recommendations affect statistical pairs. 
 
This thesis studies the relation between divergent analyst recommendations and statistical 
pairs trading. By first performing statistical pairs trading along the strategy in Gatev et al. 
(1999) and then matching the trading with divergent recommendations as described in Yu 
(2011) I examine how single statistical trades are related to divergent recommendations. 
Specifically, I study how relative post-recommendation stock price drift between two stocks 
forming a pair affects the statistical stock pairs and what implications it has on pairs trading. 
In addition, I provide evidence and characteristics about statistical pairs trading and relative 
analyst recommendations between stocks within an industry. My sample spans from year 
2000 to 2010 including United States based utility sector stocks and analyst recommendations 
to the stocks. 
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My findings are consistent with results presented in previous papers. With significant results I 
find statistical pairs trading generating positive excess return before transaction costs. The 
excess return does not survive an estimate of transaction costs, however. I find that analysts’ 
level recommendations provide some valuable information to investors, but that relative 
recommendations are far more informative. Between two stocks in a statistically formed pair 
analysts on average can distinguish the relative winner. However, divergent recommendations 
are not a driver of the positive excess returns, but rather act as a signal of a statistical pair 
breaking up which leads to negative returns. Pairs do not evidence relative post-
recommendation drift in the direction of divergent recommendations within two months of the 
announcement of recommendations. Neither is the drift consistent within one year of the 
announcements. Pairs that are not issued divergent recommendations are the main driver of 
positive abnormal return to statistical pairs trading. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a literature review of the closely 
related studies on pairs trading and analyst recommendations. Based on theory and earlier 
research I construct my hypotheses in section 3. In section 4 I describe and justify the used 
data and methodology. Section 5 presents the empirical findings and section 6 concludes the 
study. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Introduction to pairs trading 
Pairs trading is a well-known trading strategy among Wall Street brokers, hedge funds and 
investment banks’ proprietary trading desks. It is a simple trading strategy consisting of two 
assets that have represented co-movement and a relationship between the assets can be 
estimated. When the assets deviate from the estimated relationship the relatively poorly 
performed asset is bought and the relatively well performed one is sold short. When the asset 
prices converge back to the relationship and the poorly performed asset catches up (or the 
well performed asset regresses), the positions are closed and profit made. 
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There are many reasons why pairs trading has gained popularity among practitioners. The 
strategy is market neutral as you have equal long and short positions and you only trade the 
spread between the pair. Pairs trading is self-financing as gains from short selling balance the 
capital requirement for the long position. Pairs trading also eliminates the need to analyze the 
absolute pricing of securities as the spread between a pair only matters. The simplicity of the 
basic idea captures attention and as the strategy can be unlimitedly modified to include 
qualitative and quantitative as well as statistical and fundamental information, the strategy has 
found a wide supporter base. 
 
2.2. Contrarian trading strategies 
Pairs trading is a contrarian trading strategy where you buy the loser and sell the winner. The 
success of contrarian trading challenges the weak form of the efficient market hypothesis. 
Hence the effectiveness and reasons for the success of contrarian strategies have been studied 
in large amounts since the 1990s. The results of different studies on stocks are contradictory 
some finding contrarian investing profitable and some finding evidence of momentum in 
stock prices. Whether contrarian investing can produce consistent abnormal returns or why it 
sometimes does is continuously under debate. Contrarian investing is usually affiliated with 
speculating on short-term price reversals. Jegadeesh (1990) finds highly significant negative 
first-order autocorrelation in monthly stock returns and Lehmann (1990) arrives at the same 
conclusion with weekly returns, though not with longer time periods. De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985), however, show that contrarian investing can be profitable also in long-term. They 
study returns from contrarian investing with group formation and investment periods of 3 to 5 
years and find that stocks that performed poorly over the formation period gain higher returns 
during the subsequent investment period. 
 
Divergent interpretations of De Bondt’s and Thaler’s (1985) results have been expressed 
suggesting that the results can be explained by systematic risk (Chan, 1988) and size effect 
(Zarowin, 1990). Furthermore, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) note that a momentum long-
short portfolio of long past winners and short past losers produces positive returns in each 12 
months after the formation period with a notable exception being the first month where the 
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returns are negative, though not statistically significant. This observation advocates the short-
term nature of contrarian investing. 
 
In their early work Gatev et al. (1999) choose a pairs formation period of 12 months and a 
trading period of 6 months. Due to the construction of my study I will stick to the chosen 
limits. Hence, my study reflects the more comprehensively documented short-term contrarian 
effect even though Gatev et al. (2006) find that their positive returns are not driven by short-
term price reversals, but due to finding adequate pairs. Important implications from contrarian 
investing can be, however, linked to pairs trading. Lehmann (1990) notes that short-term price 
changes provide only little information about long-term price differences compared to 
fundamentals. This is one of the key ideas in pairs trading, because we are trying to exploit 
temporary mispricing. 
 
2.3. Statistical pairs trading 
Pairs can be chosen with an unlimited amount of criteria; one of the most common in 
literature is estimating statistical probabilities from the past price series. Hence, pairs trading 
is often referred to as a statistical arbitrage strategy. Most notable research paper in the field is 
by Gatev et al. (1999) where they execute a simple statistical trading strategy based on past 
price movements (presented in detail in section 2.3.1) with U.S. stocks between years 1962-
1997 and find annual excess returns of up to 12%. Gatev et al. (2006) extend their research 
with a genuinely out-of-sample test when they lengthen their time period to cover up to year 
2002 of data. Employing the exact same method they find that for period 1999-2002 the 
annual average excess return is 10%. For the full sample from 1962 to 2002 annualized excess 
returns average 11%. The out-of-sample results mitigate the data snooping problems inherent 
in pairs trading research. 
 
After since many scholars have complemented Gatev et al. (2006) by extending their work to 
include different markets or by executing different pairs trading strategies. In particular Do 
and Faff (2010) using the same methodology extend the trading period to year 2008 and find 
shrinking profits in the most recent years as was discovered also by Gatev et al. (2006). Do 
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and Faff (2010) find that smaller returns are not due to increased hedge fund activity as 
suggested by Gatev et al. (2006), but due to increased fundamental risk in the strategy as a 
larger number of pairs do not exhibit convergence that would enable profit making. This 
observation contradicts with Gatev et al. (2006) who conclude that the abnormal returns are 
compensation to arbitrageurs for enforcing the Law of One Price that assets with similar 
characteristics should have the same price. The finding by Do and Faff (2010) challenges the 
usefulness of pairs trading strategy created by Gatev et al. (2006). Results question the 
relevance of the Law of One Price acting as enforcer of the strategy. If a larger number of 
pairs do not converge, they can be assumed not to be similar in the context of the Law of One 
Price. That said, the economic reasons, if any, for the abnormal returns to the strategy remain 
uncovered. 
 
There is large interest to find economic justification for abnormal returns to statistical pairs 
trading. The excess returns contradict with weak form efficient market hypothesis and can’t 
be explained with market frictions such as trading costs or short selling constraints. As the 
excess profits are unexplained and contradict with the weak form of the efficient market 
hypothesis, scholars have had interest to test statistical pairs trading strategies under different 
settings in search for more accurate information about the phenomenon. Next I will discuss 
the existing literature on statistical pairs trading. 
 
Despite the documented declining profits, many papers have found pairs trading profitable 
under different settings in recent years. With a similar method to that of Gatev et al. (2006) 
Perlin (2009) finds positive excess returns in the Brazilian stock market in years 2000-2006. 
As did Gatev et al. (2006) Perlin also finds the strategy market neutral suggesting that pairs 
trading could provide diversification benefits to an investor. 
 
Mori and Ziobrowski (2011) reproduce the method used by Gatev et al. (2006) in a 
comparison between pairs trading with common listed stocks and listed real estate investment 
trusts (REITs). They study period 1987-2008 and find that REITs produced larger abnormal 
returns over the period from 1993 to 2000. They propose that the effect is due to the 
characteristics and regularization of REITs, because of which REITs are more homogeneous 
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than stocks on average. Hence, better pairs with long-term relationships can be formed and 
the pairs are more appropriate for pairs trading. However, after year 2000, REITs don’t 
exhibit larger abnormal profits than common stocks. This could be explained by market 
recognition of the mispricing, according to Mori and Ziobrowski (2011). A similar argument 
about homogeneity can be used in utility stocks which produce most of the positive abnormal 
returns in Gatev et al. (2006) and Do and Faff (2010). 
 
Due to their generality, liquidity and simplicity, current research is mostly concentrated on 
stock markets. There are, however, some studies on pairs trading with other asset classes. 
Nath (2003) successfully tests the method by Gatev et al. (1999) for pairs trading with U.S. 
treasury securities. He finds that during 1994-2000 the strategy produces abnormal returns 
compared to various benchmarks. Kanamura, Rachev and Fabozzi (2010) apply a pairs 
trading strategy to energy futures market between 2000 and 2008. They model the futures’ 
price spread as a mean-reverting process and find that stable profits can be made by pairs 
trading. 
 
In addition to the distance trading method by Gatev et al. (2006), two other acknowledged 
pairs trading methods have been documented. Vidyamurthy (2004) explains a statistically 
more coherent method based on cointegration between two assets. The other commonly 
referred method is by Elliott, van der Hoek and Malcolm (2005). They document a method 
known as stochastic spread method where they model the spread between two assets’ prices 
as a predictable mean reverting process. 
 
Cointegration and stochastic spread methods are very little tested in academic literature 
compared to the distance method. Bogomolov (2010) tests the returns of the three methods in 
the Australian stock market during 1996-2010. He finds significant abnormal returns for all 
the three methods before transaction costs. After accounting for transaction costs 
cointegration and stochastic spread methods were unprofitable and distance method produced 
only minimal returns. In line with other studies Bogomolov (2010) finds all three strategies 
market neutral. I focus my study on the distance method which is the most studied of the three 
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methods also with out-of-sample data. Moreover, the qualitative characteristics of the pairs 
match well with Yu’s (2011) study about pairs trading on divergent analyst recommendations. 
 
2.3.1. Distance method for pairs trading 
In academic articles widely used distance method for pairs trading was originally introduced 
in academic literature in Gatev et al. (1999). The paper presents a statistical arbitrage method 
for pairs trading violating the weak form of the efficient market hypothesis. The trading 
method is market neutral, self-financing and the abnormal returns survive conservative 
transaction costs and are not driven by bid-ask bounce, short-term price reversals, mid-term 
momentum or explained by the other two factors by Fama and French (1996): return to small 
market capitalization stocks or value stocks. Afterwards Gatev et al. (2006) provide an out-of-
sample test for their results to eliminate data snooping problems. 
 
The distance method for pairs trading is purely based on stock price co-movement. Identify 
stocks that have moved together in the past and when they deviate from their relationship, sell 
the relative winner and buy the relative loser. When the stock prices converge back to the 
relationship, close the position. Effectively the spread between two stock prices is traded. 
Profit is made when the spread converges back after a deviation. 
 
Stocks that move together are identified from a wide space of stocks. The pairs are formed 
during an estimation period by matching stocks that minimize the sum of squared deviations 
between the stocks’ normalized price series including re-invested dividends. The price series 
are normalized to eliminate the level difference in the sum of squared deviations calculations. 
The number of eligible tested pairs is n*(n-1)/2, where n is the total number of shares. 
 
The top pairs with the smallest sums of squared deviations are traded during a trading period. 
A position is opened when the spread reaches a pre-specified threshold value and closed when 
the spread converges back to a pre-specified value. The threshold levels to open and close a 
trade can be specified in for example standard deviations estimated from the realized spread. 
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Within the basic framework several trading rules can be altered. Minimum price and liquidity 
measures as well as fundamental factors can be required in the selection of stocks. The pairs 
estimation and trading periods’ lengths as well as the number of pairs traded and the re-
estimation interval can be altered. Different threshold levels for divergence and convergence 
can be set and maximum holding periods or stop-loss rules applied. 
 
Strengths of the distance method include simplicity and modifiability. Largest drawback is 
that the method is highly dependent on the chosen space of stocks. If the stocks are really 
different, even the closest pairs may not witness close absolute co-movement even though 
being the closest pair of the sample, which can lead to trading with poor pairs as Do and Faff 
(2010) remark. This can be prevented with a comprehensive set of stocks which in turn leads 
to laborious calculations. And on the other hand too close pairs may not deviate enough to 
allow for trading at all or the absolute divergence might not be large enough to cover for 
transaction costs even if the pair converges, as Gatev et al. (2006) note. 
 
In their work Gatev et al. (1999) assign values to different parameters arbitrarily. Chosen 
estimation period of 12 months, trading period of 6 months, re-estimation interval of 1 month, 
number of traded pairs 5 and 20, divergence threshold to open a trade of 2 standard deviations 
and convergence threshold to close a trade of 0 standard deviations are not properly tested for 
feasibility since they were initially arbitrarily assigned. Gatev et al. (2006) and Do and Faff 
(2010) use the same variable values in their out-of-sample tests. 
 
Various studies have addressed the restrictions and constraints of the presented statistical 
pairs trading strategies. In search for a solution to these issues mathematically more 
sophisticated methods have been proposed by some scholars e.g. Huck (2009, 2010), Lin, 
McCrae and Gulati (2006) and Jurek and Yang (2007). New problems often involved in these 
attempts are difficult modeling, losing the practicality, inability to interpret the results and 
data snooping problems. Alongside the statistical trading another school of pairs trading has 
emerged basing their research on fundamental information such as accounting information, 
macro-economic development and news flow. Fundamental information as a basis for pairs 
trading does not include many of the problems inherent in statistical arbitrage models. When 
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statistical models often overlook the economic justification, models based on fundamentals 
reflect this exact information. The next section provides a review of the existing literature on 
pairs trading in the context of fundamental information. 
 
2.4. Fundamental information and information shocks in pairs trading 
Only until recently academically documented pairs trading research has been mainly about 
statistical arbitrage. After the decline in profits from simple statistical pairs trading due to 
faster-paced trading, more cost-effective execution and increase in arbitrage activity for 
example, research on pairs trading has increasingly started to concentrate on fundamental 
information. The economic reasons for the existence of profitable pairs trading opportunities 
has become more and more interesting displacing the traditional research on how to best 
benefit from the phenomenon. The existing research in the context of pairs trading covers 
topics under quarterly earnings announcements and analysts’ earnings forecasts (Papadakis 
and Wysocki, 2008), analysts’ recommendations (Yu, 2011), firm-specific and industry 
specific news, analyst coverage, institutional holding, liquidity, macro-economic risk-factors 
(Engelberg, Gao and Jagannathan, 2009), attention distraction (Jacobs and Weber, 2011) and 
supplier-customer relationships (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008). Next I discuss the existing 
research on fundamentals in detail. 
 
New information can create fast and large movements in stock prices. I refer to these kinds of 
events as information shocks. Information shocks depending on the situation can provide 
good opportunities for pairs trading with a large divergence from the relationship or they can 
also create false opportunities by changing or destroying the relationship in a way that the pair 
never converges and the trade makes a loss. In a case where a position is open during an 
information shock the outcome may result in larger or smaller returns, respectively. Because 
of the double-edged sword effect, information shocks provide opportunities and threats and 
one needs to be extra careful in trading around information shocks. 
 
Papadakis and Wysocki (2008) study the impact of earnings announcements and analysts’ 
forecast revisions on pairs trading with U.S. stocks in 1981-2006. Applying the distance 
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method in pairs formation they find that these information announcements have significant 
effect on pairs trading. Pairs trading is often opened close to earnings announcements or 
analysts’ forecast announcements. Furthermore, they find that pairs trades opened after 
announcements are less profitable than pairs trades opened without an effect from information 
events. This may have implications on analyst recommendations since announcements 
provide new information which becomes visible in recommendations. Divergent 
recommendations may then indicate divergence in the pair based on new information. 
 
Finally, Papadakis and Wysocki (2008) find that delaying closing of pairs after earnings 
announcements or analysts’ forecasts results in significantly higher returns. All in all their 
findings show evidence about drift in stock prices after earnings announcements. This drift 
indicates that earnings announcements and analysts’ earnings forecasts do have significant 
effect on the returns to an unrestricted pairs trading strategy proposed by Gatev et al. (1999). 
Accordingly the result information in companies’ earnings announcements or analysts’ 
forecasts can be taken into account in opening and closing of pairs positions. It seems that 
divergence after news is a sign of a broken relationship between a pair. Because trades are 
better closed after analysts’ forecast announcement, it also seems that analysts issue forecasts 
based on divergence and with the forecasts they accelerate convergence. However, the authors 
don’t study the contents of the new information. Whether the reported earnings are expected 
or surprising either negatively or positively is not studied. Neither is the content of analysts’ 
forecasts whether positive, negative or neutral taken into consideration. 
 
In a recent study Yu (2011) studies analyst recommendations. She develops a new method for 
pairs trading based solely on analysts’ recommendations. The method does not use any 
statistical properties of the stocks. Pool of which pairs are picked is formed by placing all 
stocks in a matrix by their industry and size-class. A pairs trade is triggered when the same 
analyst gives simultaneously divergent recommendations (buy and hold, hold and sell or buy 
and sell) for two stocks within the same industry and size category. A long position is taken in 
the stock that receives more favorable recommendation and a short position in the stock that 
receives less favorable recommendation. Hence, the strategy is dependent on single analysts’ 
recommendation accuracy and timing. Yu (2011) finds analysts’ recommendations to have 
investment value during her sample period 1994-2009. She also finds her pairs trading based 
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on analysts’ recommendations to generate positive risk-adjusted excess returns of 2.2% in 6 
months. Yu (2011) does not describe an exact trading strategy since she does not define a rule 
for closing trades. She only has a rule for opening trades and tests the returns for different 
time periods. She finds the returns statistically significant on periods of 1, 3 and up to 6 
months. 
 
The above mentioned studies have focused on firm-specific information shocks. Another 
category is the information that affects the market as a whole or companies within a specific 
industry for example. However, as Papadakis and Wysocki (2008) also discuss, information 
perceived as firm-specific may often include relevant fundamental information about other 
companies as well. Hence, the information shock may affect both stocks in a pair, especially 
since pairs are often formed of companies within the same industry and size. The spillover 
effect within an industry is documented in for example Foster (1981) and Ramnath (2002). In 
addition Cohen and Frazzini (2006) provide evidence of the spillover effect in a supplier-
customer relationship with companies from different industries. Pairs trading can also be 
implemented with such companies, if the link between the companies is strong enough. 
 
Cohen and Frazzini (2008) identify strong supplier-customer relationships and test their pairs 
trading potential. They find that a pairs trading strategy short selling the suppliers’ stocks 
whose customers’ stocks had the largest negative returns in the recent month and buying the 
suppliers’ stocks whose customers’ stocks had the largest positive returns in the last month 
yields significant abnormal return of 18.6% per annum. Findings support the view that stock 
prices evidence drift after initial underreaction to information. The findings provide also 
results about the spillover effect over industry boundaries as on average 77% of the pairs are 
from different industries. 
 
Similar to general information shocks, the effect to pairs trading from information spillover 
depends on characteristics of the stocks. If both stocks react quickly to the information, there 
might not be any divergence to take advantage of. On the other hand if other company reacts 
to the information faster and the other with a slow drift, there might be a very profitable fast 
converging pairs trading possibility. 
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Engelberg, Gao and Jagannathan (2009) study the difference in pairs trading returns whether 
the initial divergence is due to firm-specific (idiosyncratic) news or industry-level shocks. 
Applying the distance method to pairs within the same industry they find that returns are 
lower when the initial divergence is due to news affecting the value of only one of the stocks 
in a pair. In such a case the divergence is more likely to be permanent and not result in a 
profit. This result indicates that an investor should not trade a pair that diverges after firm-
specific news. It also provides evidence that the spillover effect is not common in a pairs 
trading framework. Finally, the profitability is highly dependent on the liquidity 
characteristics of the stocks in a pair, and especially how the characteristics differ. 
Information shocks that produce positive returns are those that temporarily reduce liquidity of 
one of the stocks in a pair or that affect both stocks, but other reacts faster. As a general rule, 
the more liquid stocks that react faster to common shocks are from larger corporations with 
more sell-side analyst coverage and larger institutional holdings. An optimal pair appears to 
be a closely related pair within the same industry, but other company large and liquid and the 
other small and less liquid. 
 
Jacobs and Weber (2011) research pairs trading returns in different information settings. They 
study the effect of large flows of general information distracting market participants from 
analyzing firm-specific information. An underlying assumption is that in a case of important 
general news, market participants focus on the effects of the general news instead of 
analyzing firm-level information as they do when there aren’t other distractions. The 
disregard of firm-level information leads to inefficiencies as market participants don’t focus 
on keeping the relative prices of securities in line. As a result divergences from assets’ 
relationships merge. Jacobs and Weber (2011) test the hypothesis in U.S. as well as in eight 
other major stock markets. Following the distance method in pairs formation they find that 
pairs opening on high distraction days produce significantly higher returns than pairs opening 
on low distraction days.  The probability of pairs converging faster is also higher for pairs 
opening on high distraction days. The phenomenon holds for other perceived market 
inefficiencies such as investors having smaller attention on weekdays before holidays, Fridays 
(DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009) and down market periods (Karlsson, Loewenstein and Seppi, 
2009). In line with Jacobs and Weber (2011), Peress (2008) finds that media coverage has less 
influence on immediate returns and post-announcement drift for individual stocks on days 
with high distraction than on days with low distraction. 
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The results of Engelberg et al. (2009) and Jacobs and Weber (2011) underline the importance 
of the reason for divergence in stock prices. The results point to following market- or 
industry-wide news as reason for divergence instead of firm-level news. Their results also 
emphasize the fact that the reason for divergence dictates the probability of convergence. 
 
2.5. Analyst recommendations 
Previous section introduced the existing research on pairs trading. A common feature to 
almost all the cited papers is that they argue for the economic justifications for the success of 
statistical pairs trading. A study by Yu (2011) does not take a stand on statistical pairs trading, 
but instead finds a pairs trading strategy based solely on divergent analyst recommendations 
generating excess risk-adjusted return. In this study I examine the possible effects of the 
phenomenon found by Yu (2011) on the statistical pairs trading strategy described in Gatev et 
al. (2006) and studied by several scholars without yet to recognize the underlying economic 
reasons. Recommendations reflect information in both fundamentals and stock prices, which 
makes them an interesting match to purely statistical trading. Next I review the related 
studies’ findings about analyst recommendations. 
 
There are several frequently cited papers that conclude that analyst recommendations, if 
interpreted correctly, can have information value to investors, e.g. Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische 
and Lee (2004), Elton, Gruber and Grossmann (1986), Womack (1996) and Barber, Lehavy, 
McNichols and Trueman (2001). The results are the same that my main reference paper Yu 
(2011) concludes. 
 
2.5.1. Level recommendations 
Elton et al. (1986) find investment value in analyst level recommendations by examining 
broker houses’ buy and sell lists. On average buy list returns 0.80 %-points more monthly 
than the sell list. Barber et al. (2001) study more closely trading strategies based on consensus 
level recommendations. They find that recommendations do have investment value, but 
capitalizing on recommendations requires fast reaction to changes and leads to high trading 
which in effect leads to high trading costs. After accounting for trading costs Barber et al. 
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(2001) do not find trading strategies based on consensus recommendations profitable. 
Womack (1996) points out that information analysis and issuing recommendations is costly 
and researchers must be compensated; one part of the compensation comes from commissions 
from trading stocks. Because the reaction to changes in consensus recommendations needs to 
be within days, the abnormal return can be attributed to recommendation changes as opposed 
to simple level recommendations. 
 
In contrast to the findings of Barber et al. (2001) Jegadeesh et al. (2004) find that consensus 
level recommendations do not always add value. They also find that positive performance of 
recommendations is driven by momentum factors. The value in the absolute recommendations 
is not unambiguous. One significant source of influence on recommendations has found to be 
analysts’ bias when issuing recommendations. 
 
2.5.2. Bias in recommendations 
Sell-side equity analysts who issue investment recommendations for listed securities are 
under the pressure of conflicts of interest arising from career concerns and compensation. 
Vast majority of analysts issuing recommendations are sell-side analysts. Conflicts of interest 
are between issuing objective forecasts and recommendations and issuing forecasts and 
recommendations that are beneficial for their employer and thus for themselves. Conflicts of 
interest often induce analysts to issue overly optimistic forecasts and recommendations. Many 
studies have found analyst recommendations to contain bias towards more positive 
recommendations. Michaely and Womack (2005) provide a comprehensive review of 
literature up to year 2002, theory and practice of analyst forecasts and recommendations, 
conflicts of interests and biases. To demonstrate the problem in applying level 
recommendations in trading I discuss the most relevant themes brought forward in Michaely 
and Womack (2005) as well as refer to relevant new studies on analyst recommendations and 
bias. 
 
Issues affecting analyst recommendations are eclectic, but predominantly the pressure is to 
issue overly optimistic forecasts or recommendations. Hong and Kubik (2003) find that 
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brokerage houses reward optimistic analysts. With a comprehensive sample of 12 000 
analysts and 600 brokerage firms between years 1983 and 2000 they find that the accuracy of 
analyst forecasts matters for their career advancement, but also that relatively optimistic 
analysts have more favorable career paths. In addition, they find that analyst forecasts are 
judged less on accuracy and more on optimism when a stock underwritten by their employer 
is in question. The optimism is rewarded presumably, because optimistic analyst reports 
generate investment banking business and trading commissions as discussed in e.g. Michaely 
and Womack (2005). In line with theory that conflicts of interests cause a positive bias, 
Carleton, Chen and Steiner (1998) find that sell-side analysts issue more optimistic 
recommendations than buy-side analysts. Uniformly they find that buy-side analysts predict 
investment performance more accurately than sell-side analysts. 
 
Michaely and Womack (1999) find that analysts do act accordingly to findings in Hong and 
Kubik (2003) and issue more favorable recommendations when the stock is underwritten by 
their employer. The effect is not driven by better analyzing skills or superior information, 
since the stocks positively recommended by underwriter-related analysts significantly 
underperform the stocks positively recommended by nonunderwriter-related analysts. The 
bias is not the only plausible explanation. Underwriter analysts’ genuine believe in the stocks 
or selection bias cannot be reliably ruled out. It can be that share issuers select those 
investment banks as underwriters whose analysts have the most positive view about the share 
issues. 
 
Firth, Lin, Liu and Xuan (2011) study the effects mutual fund relationships have on analysts’ 
recommendations. Since mutual funds bring a large proportion of brokers’ trading 
commissions, broker firms have incentives to please the mutual fund managers. Firth et al. 
(2011) find that analysts issue more favorable recommendations to stocks that are in the 
portfolios of mutual funds from which they get brokerage business. Optimism is positively 
related to the weight of the stock in the mutual funds’ portfolios and to the amount of 
brokerage commissions the mutual fund generates. They also find evidence that the results are 
not due to mutual funds following recommendations of brokerages they do most business 
with, but due to pressure from mutual funds that already hold the stocks in question. 
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Kolasinski and Kothari (2008) study analysts’ biases in M&A deals. They find that analysts 
affiliated with the advisor of the acquirer are more likely to upgrade their recommendation for 
the acquirer stock than unaffiliated analysts. The optimism is strongly explained by the bias 
analysts have to issue favorable recommendations to stocks that bring their company advisory 
business. Cicero, Kalpathy and Sulaeman (2010) find that analysts bias their 
recommendations to induce corporate borrowers to their lending arm. They find that 
companies are more likely to borrow from banks whose analysts issue favorable 
recommendations in expect to be able to borrow cheaper from a favorable bank. 
 
Previously mentioned papers provide evidence of the conflicts of interest introducing biases 
that distort recommendations from analysts’ objective opinions. Lim (2001) suggests a 
different view on the reasons for the positive bias. He suggests that analysts have a rational 
positive bias in their forecasts which is attributed to the objective of producing as accurate 
forecasts as possible. Positive analysts have better access to companies’ management for 
information which in effect leads to more accurate forecasts. Lim (2001) creates a model that 
evaluates forecast error as a function of bias, accuracy and available information. He finds 
that positive bias may be optimal to reach accurate forecasts. 
 
Even though positive bias is the consensus conclusion, there are also differing findings. 
Clarke, Ferris, Jayaraman and Lee (2006) find that analysts do not issue optimistic 
recommendations to financially distressed companies with which they have an investment 
banking relationship. Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2003) provide evidence that analysts 
have in fact bias to issue pessimistic forecasts. Due to many reasons, e.g. to attract investment 
banking business, analysts want to be in the favor of the management of the companies they 
cover. Managers on the other hand want to beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. In these 
situations the managers and analysts have a common interest to match earnings to forecasts. If 
the company is falling short of forecasts, analysts can revise their forecasts disproportionately 
downwards before the earnings announcement to let the company exceed forecasts. 
 
The reviewed literature argues for a bias in analyst recommendations. For a detailed analysis 
on the diversified issue of bias in analyst recommendations I refer to Michaely and Womack 
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(2005) and a deeper look into the cited articles. The important conclusion to be drawn is that 
recommendations are affected by conflicts of interest and that they are most likely positively 
biased. Hence, level recommendations are noisy and for an investor it is better to look at 
relative recommendations that may contain more information. In the cited papers e.g. 
Kolanski and Kothari (2008) find that recommendation changes provide more informative 
results and are economically more meaningful than simple level recommendations. 
 
2.5.3. Relative recommendations 
The problems in level recommendations have led to research on relative recommendations. 
Most studied form of relative recommendations is the relation of recommendations in time i.e. 
changes in recommendations. Studying recommendation changes instead of absolute 
recommendations eliminates the problems of stickiness and partly the bias to issue better 
recommendations. 
 
Elton et al. (1986) find investment value in recommendation changes. They also find 
investment value in level recommendations, but excess returns are larger, when changes in 
recommendations are reviewed rather than only level recommendations. They attribute this to 
the stickiness of recommendations. Analysts are not eager to change their recommendations 
and hence a recommendation change implies material new information about the company, 
whereas the level recommendation is sticky and might put too much weight on old 
information. Womack (1996) finds similar results studying additions and removals of stocks 
from the buy and sell lists of brokerage houses. He finds that analysts do possess market 
timing and stock picking skills and that positive abnormal return can be gained by following 
additions to buy and sell lists. Jegadeesh et al. (2004), who find that consensus level 
recommendations do not add value, also find that recommendation changes contain valuable 
information to investors. Brav and Lehavy (2003) conclude that the magnitude of 
recommendation change conveys also valuable information. E.g. recommendation change 
from hold to strong buy is associated with larger abnormal returns than change from hold to 
buy. 
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Another form of relative recommendations is recommendations relative to industry consensus 
or peers within the same industry. Since analysts often specialize in a given industry, and use 
relative valuation techniques, they are well positioned to issue relative recommendations even 
though the absolute recommendations may be affected by biases or weak ability to analyze 
market or macro information. Hong and Kubik (2003) note that average analyst in I/B/E/S 
database follows 9.3 companies in a year and hence has a view on the relative superiority of 
the companies. Da and Schaumburg (2011) analyze a long-short trading strategy based on 
expected return implied by analysts’ target prices and the prevailing stock price between 1997 
and 2004. Similar to the pairs trading method I employ, the long-short strategy involves 
buying short-term losers and selling short-term winners. They find that investors can get more 
information by comparing analysts’ reports between stocks within the same industry than 
between all stocks. They find that analysts are unable to forecast market return or relative 
return to different industries, and that absolute target prices are not as informative as target 
prices relative to industry peers. Similar to Gatev et al. (2006) and Do and Faff (2010) find for 
statistical pairs trading, Da and Schaumburg (2011) find lower returns to the strategy in the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century than in the end of the 1990s. 
 
In pairs trading stocks are priced relative to each other. When issuing recommendations 
analysts frequently use valuation multiples within an industry as a basis for their analysis. 
Asquith, Mikhail and Au (2005) document that 99.1% of analysts use earnings multiples in 
valuation. Multiples based valuation is relative valuation between stocks within the same 
industry. If the method is a valid one to value shares and analysts issue their recommendations 
accordingly, then relative analyst recommendations within an industry are valuable to 
investors. This has strong implications on pairs trading based on divergent recommendations. 
 
Boni and Womack (2006) test analysts’ ability to rank stocks within an industry. Their 
findings tie together research about consensus level recommendations, recommendation 
changes and relative recommendations between peers and industries. Studying years from 
1996 to 2002 they find that analysts’ level recommendations even within an industry do not 
have valuable information content. They also find that analysts do not have ability to predict 
the winner and looser industries when comparing industry consensus level recommendations. 
The finding is in line with theory that analysts issue recommendations to stocks within an 
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industry and they have bias to issue buy recommendations. Boni and Womack (2006) find 
most value in analyst recommendations when changes in recommendations are compared 
between stocks within an industry. Conclusion from their study is that analysts are experts in 
the industry they specialize, but their level recommendations are affected by biases. Hence, 
analysts express their relative opinions about companies (and investment value can be found) 
in relative recommendation changes between companies. 
 
Yu (2011) tests relative recommendations from individual analysts. She trades pairs of stocks 
where she matches stocks belonging to the same industry and size class. Pairs are traded 
based on newly announced divergent recommendations for the stocks issued at the same time 
by the same analyst. She finds the strategy producing excess returns and thus single analysts’ 
relative recommendations are valuable to investors. 
 
2.5.4. Stock price drift after recommendation announcements 
Most of the above mentioned studies use daily closing prices implying that by following 
analyst recommendations it is possible for an investor to gain positive abnormal returns. This 
conclusion violates the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis that all public 
information is reflected in the market prices immediately. For the purposes of this study it is 
important to examine how quickly the gains from following recommendations diminish after 
the recommendation is announced i.e. how fast does an investor have to react to 
recommendation changes in order to benefit from the post-recommendation stock price drift. 
 
Barber et al. (2001) study the matter and note that stock price reactions to recommendation 
changes are not instant, but the drift is very short-lived and possible gains diminish in less 
than a week for stocks with buy recommendation and in one month for sell recommendations. 
Elton et al. (1986) find that information from a recommendation change is fully absorbed in 
the stock price within three months. They see that there is a problem with following sticky 
level recommendations as a stock holds a certain recommendation for a too long period. 
Therefore, they conclude that excess returns that can be earned by buying a recommended list 
at any point in time disappear within two months. Womack (1996) and Jegadeesh et al. (2004) 
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find similar results. Womack (1996) concludes that for the new buy recommendations excess 
returns diminish during the first month and for new sell recommendations during the first six 
months. Jegadeesh et al. (2004) find that excess returns earned from recommendation changes 
occur in the first three to six months. 
 
Yu (2011) finds that risk-adjusted positive returns to pairs trading according to analyst 
recommendations are statistically significant up to 6 months after the recommendation 
announcements. Yu’s (2011) and the above mentioned papers’ results are interesting in 
relation to statistical pairs trading strategy by Gatev et al. (1999). Gatev et al. (1999) use a 6-
month trading period in their trading strategy and hence the same effect that is present in 
analyst recommendations, if any, is likely to be present in the strategy. Furthermore, Gatev et 
al. (2006) find that both stocks in most pairs are close to each other in size and mainly both 
belong to the same industry. This strengthens the base for the joint study since Yu (2011) also 
tested pairs from the same industry and size-class. I study newly announced 
recommendations. Part of announced recommendations are changed recommendations and 
part repetitions of the existing recommendations. Hence my study is neither about changes in 
recommendations nor about pure level recommendations, but something in between. Goal is 
to study whether the same effect that is in recommendation announcements according to the 
study by Yu (2011) is present in the statistical pairs trading by Gatev et al. (1999). 
 
3. Hypotheses 
I study whether relative analyst recommendations affect the returns to statistical pairs trading 
by incorporating fundamental information to the pairs or through price drift that the 
recommendations themselves cause. I form my hypotheses on the basis of theory and results 
from earlier research. 
 
First I study the statistical trading with a recent set of data. Gatev et al. (2006) and Do and 
Faff (2010) find that statistical pairs trading with the distance method generates positive 
abnormal returns. They both show utility sector stocks to yield the largest positive abnormal 
returns when traded in statistical pairs. Utilities have the fundamental properties for long-term 
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stable relationships and are therefore well-suited for short-term pairs trading. I study pairs 
trading with a sample of utility stocks applying a similar distance method as Gatev et al. 
(2006) and Do and Faff (2010). The expectation is that trading results in positive abnormal 
returns. Hence, my first hypothesis: 
H1: Statistical pairs trading generates positive abnormal returns. 
 
Secondly I test the investments value in relative analyst recommendations. Relative analysis 
between stocks within same industry has been found informative in Papadakis and Wysocki 
(2008) and recently Yu (2011) found that relative recommendations between a pair of stocks 
belonging to the same industry and size class are valuable to investors. Drift in stock price 
after an issue of new recommendation has been estimated to last from one week up to six 
months. I test consensus recommendations on a 6-month period between two stocks forming a 
statistical pair. Based on earlier studies about recommendations and stock price drift, and 
theoretical background for value in relative recommendations, I expect to find relative 
recommendations valuable to investors. I arrive at my second hypothesis: 
H2: Analysts’ relative recommendations have investment value. 
 
Finally I study the effects relative recommendations have on statistically traded pairs. For the 
recommendations to drive positive abnormal returns to pairs trading, hypotheses 1 and 2 
should be accepted. Specifically, I study whether divergent recommendations, being differing 
recommendations issued by a single analyst for two stocks forming a statistical pair, affect the 
statistical pairs. My definition measures well with the definition of divergent 
recommendations in Yu (2011). 
 
Divergent recommendations can affect the pair in two ways: by enlarging the spread between 
the two stocks or by narrowing the spread. This can result in multiple implications on returns 
to pairs trading depending on the timing of the recommendations and the direction of the pairs 
trade. Assuming recommendations reflect correctly fundamental information and that markets 
act accordingly, if divergent recommendations are given before the opening of the trade, they 
cause the spread to widen up to the trigger point of opening a pairs trade. These trades are 
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expected to yield negative returns since the statistical pair has separated due to fundamental 
information, which is according to findings in Papadakis and Wysocki (2008) and Engelberg 
et al. (2009). The spread may continue to widen after trade opening or it may find a new 
equilibrium. In any case the pair does not anymore follow the original estimated relationship. 
 
If recommendations are issued after the opening of the trade, they may cause the spread to 
widen further or narrow down depending on the direction of the recommendations and the 
direction of the pairs trade. In the former case analysts are lagging behind the market and the 
market has already acted on the information before analysts have issued their 
recommendations. Recommendations accelerate the widening of the spread. Pairs trade yields 
negative return as the pair never converges and the original relationship does not hold. In the 
latter case analysts see the spread between the pair being too large and they issue 
recommendations that narrow the spread. Analysts act as enforcers of the Law of One Price 
and they have a positive impact on the return to pairs trade since they effectively close the 
spread. 
 
In summary, the effects of divergent recommendations can be divided into three categories: 
(1) recommendations issued before the opening of pairs trade and (2) recommendations issued 
after opening of trade having a direction to widen the spread are expected to have a negative 
impact on the return and (3) recommendations issued after opening of trade having direction 
to narrow the spread are expected to have a positive impact on the return. Hence hypothesis 3 
on the effects of divergent recommendations on the returns to statistical pairs trading is also 
divided into three parts: 
H3a: Pairs trades opened after announcement of divergent 
recommendations yield abnormal negative returns. 
H3b: Pairs trades that receive divergent recommendations in the 
direction to widen the spread after the trade is opened yield 
abnormal negative returns. 
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H3c: Pairs trades that receive divergent recommendations in the 
direction to narrow the spread after the trade is opened yield 
abnormal positive returns. 
 
The aggregate effect of divergent recommendations depends on the relative number of 
observations in the three categories. If statistical pairs trading yields abnormal positive returns 
and the market anomaly is explained by divergent recommendations, then divergent 
recommendations in the direction to narrow the spread issued after opening of pairs trade are 
expected to dominate. 
 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1. Data description 
The data consists of daily returns and analysts’ recommendations for United States based 
common stocks from utilities sector for the period 2000-2010. The daily returns are collected 
from The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Return series are total 
returns i.e. adjusted for dividends and other cash payments as well as stock splits and mergers. 
Only stocks with share codes 10 and 11 are allowed to restrict the sample to common stocks. 
Utilities sector stocks are identified with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) major group 
two-digit code 49. The use of share codes 10 and 11 to identify common stocks and use of 
SIC code 49 to identify utilities is the same approach as in Do and Faff (2010). Stocks that 
experience one or more days without trades during the pairs formation period are excluded 
from the data similarly to Gatev et al. (1999). Analysts’ recommendations are obtained from 
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) Details Recommendation database. Daily 
recommendations are gathered from all analysts for all stocks that I trade from December 
2000 to December 2010. 
 
The criteria for data selection need to be justified. The data is selected based on the main aim 
of the paper: to study the connection of divergent analyst recommendations as discussed in 
Yu (2011) and statistical pairs trading’s returns presented in Gatev et al. (2006). Gatev et al. 
(2006) report that the positive abnormal return is clearly pronounced within the utilities 
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sector. The reported positive excess monthly return for the top 20 pairs trading strategy is 
0.90% and excess monthly return in the utilities sector is 1.08%. Furthermore, the average 
sector weight of utilities in the whole strategy is 55%. Hence, to understand what drives the 
positive returns to the strategy, it is important to understand what drives the positive returns 
within utilities sector. Reported results in Do and Faff (2010) are consistent with those of 
Gatev et al. (2006). Da and Schaumburg (2011) find that relative target prices are more 
accurate for stocks with higher fraction of tangible assets. This conclusion is consistent with 
the selection of utility stocks. Following Gatev et al. (2006) only common stocks and stocks 
with positive trading volume each day during formation period are included in the sample. 
 
Gatev et al. (2006) study the pairs trading strategy from 1962 through 2002 and Do and Faff 
(2010) extend the period up to 2008. They both find the strategy profitable, but record 
declining profits for the most recent years. Nonetheless, positive excess returns have been 
recorded also in the recent years. In addition, this study is about the effect of analyst estimates 
which Yu (2011) tested for a relatively recent period of 1994-2009. Da and Schaumburg 
(2011) point out that in August 2000 SEC adopted Regulation Fair Disclosure before which 
analysts could have had access to material corporate information not available publicly. 
Hence, after August 2000 the role of analyst recommendations as information provider has 
changed. The changes in abnormal returns and analyst recommendations affect my study 
significantly. In my study I am interested in the current investment environment. To have a 
validated base for my research and to produce up-to-date results I choose a sample period 
from year 2000 to 2010. 
 
The full data consists of more than 678 000 daily return observations from over 150 stocks 
over a period of 11 years. The average number of stocks with positive trading volume every 
day is 115 and the average number of potential pairs is 6 602 each period. The data is similar 
to earlier research as Gatev et al. (2006) report average number of utility stocks of 156 during 
1962-2002. 
 
The number of analyst recommendations suitable for my study in the I/B/E/S database is 
3 126, on average 156 issued new recommendations for top 20 traded pairs during 7 months, 
26 
 
starting one month prior to trading period and ending at the trading period end. The total 
number of recommendations for both stocks in a pair from the same analyst is 305, on 
average 15 in a trading period, and the number of divergent recommendations is 150, on 
average 8 in a trading period. On average 25.8% of stocks in the top 20 pairs have no 
recommendations, which is in line with Boni and Womack (2006) who document that 25.6% 
of their sample stocks do not have recommendations registered in the I/B/E/S database during 
1996 through 2002. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the stock and recommendation 
data used in the study. 
 
The number of stocks with positive trading volume during pairs formation period stays 
relatively stable throughout the sample period. The number of recommendations in the 
database increases in time. The number of recommendations, recommendations for both 
stocks in a pair from same analyst and the number of divergent recommendations all show a 
rising trend. Mean number of divergent recommendations in a trading period on the first half 
of sample is 5.6 and on the second half 9.4. This can be attributed to increase in the number of 
recommendations and development in data collection to cover more brokerage houses as Brav 
and Lehavy (2003), Lim (2001) and Hong and Kubik (2003) document. The number of 
recommendations shows also seasonal variation. Number of recommendations is largest in 
years 2002 to 2003 and from the second half of 2007 to the first half of 2010, the same years 
equity markets hit their bottoms. 
 
Panel B in Table 1 reports descriptive recommendation statistics divided to pairs’ level. Mean 
number of recommendations during trading period for a pair is 7.9 with maximum of 39 and 
minimum of 0. Mean number of recommendations from the same analysts for both stocks in a 
pair is 0.8 and number of divergent recommendations even lower 0.4. The mean number of 
divergent recommendations during a trading period for all 20 pairs is 8 which is enough for 
trading. 
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Table 1 
Description of data 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the used data from year 2000 to 2010 with 20 6-month trading periods. Panel A shows figures for all trading periods and Panel B for 
individual pairs. Notation 1/2001 denotes trading period that lasts for the first half of year 2001 and notation 2/2001 denotes trading period that lasts for the second half of 
year 2001, etc. Recommendation figures are from a 7-month period starting one month prior to trading period and ending at the end of trading period. In Panel A 
recommendation figures are totals for top 20 pairs and in Panel B figures are for individual top 20 pairs. 
 
  Number of stocks 
Number of 
potential 
pairs 
Mean trading period 
return for sample 
stocks 
Mean trading period 
volatility for sample 
stocks 
Number of 
recommendations 
for top 20 pairs 
Number of 
recommendations from 
same analyst for both 
stocks in top 20 pairs 
Number of divergent 
recommendations for 
top 20 pairs 
Panel A: Trading periods             
1/2001 120 7 140 9.0 % 26.8 % 106 5 2 
2/2001 118 6 903 -3.3 % 23.9 % 84 2 2 
1/2002 119 7 021 -2.1 % 22.9 % 159 15 8 
2/2002 114 6 441 -13.8 % 41.9 % 270 24 10 
1/2003 110 5 995 18.7 % 24.3 % 226 36 15 
2/2003 110 5 995 15.5 % 20.0 % 147 17 10 
1/2004 108 5 778 4.3 % 15.4 % 134 8 5 
2/2004 114 6 441 14.6 % 16.5 % 108 9 3 
1/2005 113 6 328 11.9 % 16.7 % 117 5 1 
2/2005 117 6 786 0.6 % 18.7 % 106 2 0 
1/2006 120 7 140 8.8 % 17.3 % 74 3 2 
2/2006 120 7 140 15.4 % 13.9 % 155 15 5 
1/2007 120 7 140 5.3 % 16.0 % 135 4 1 
2/2007 120 7 140 2.7 % 22.6 % 172 15 8 
1/2008 116 6 670 -4.8 % 23.0 % 152 18 8 
2/2008 114 6 441 -20.2 % 48.2 % 144 22 15 
1/2009 110 5 995 -0.2 % 32.3 % 217 31 16 
2/2009 114 6 441 16.8 % 21.6 % 223 40 25 
1/2010 114 6 441 -4.8 % 20.5 % 196 19 10 
2/2010 116 6 670 17.9 % 17.0 % 201 15 4 
       
Continued 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Description of data 
 
  Number of stocks 
Number of 
potential 
pairs 
Mean trading period 
return for sample 
stocks 
Mean trading period 
volatility for sample 
stocks 
Number of 
recommendations 
for top 20 pairs 
Number of 
recommendations from 
same analyst for both 
stocks in top 20 pairs 
Number of divergent 
recommendations for 
top 20 pairs 
Panel A: Trading periods             
Mean 115 6 602 4.6 % 23.0 % 156 15 8 
Median 115 6 556 4.8 % 21.1 % 150 15 7 
Standard deviation 4 444 10.8 % 8.8 % 52 11 6 
   
    
   
Panel B: Pairs               
Mean na. na. na. na. 7.8 0.8 0.4 
Median na. na. na. na. 7 0 0 
Maximum na. na. na. na. 39 10 6 
Minimum na. na. na. na. 0 0 0 
Standard deviation na. na. na. na. 5.7 1.5 0.9 
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4.2. Methodology 
In pairs formation and trading I follow closely the methodology employed in Gatev et al. 
(2006). Parts where the study differs from the methods of Gatev et al. (2006) or where I have 
had to make my own assumptions are pointed out clearly. Pairs are formed over a formation 
period of 12 months and traded over the subsequent period of 6 months. Afterwards closest 20 
pairs eligible for trading are examined for analyst recommendations. 
 
4.2.1. Pairs formation 
First I calculate a cumulative value series from the total return series for all stocks. The series 
are normalized to start from 1 in the beginning of the formation period in order to eliminate 
level differences in stock prices when calculating squared residuals. Equation 1 states the 
calculation of the cumulative value series: 
Vs,t = (1 + rs,t) ∙ Vs,t-1 ,   (1) 
where Vs,t is the value of stock s at time t and rs,t is the total return to stock s from time t-1 to 
time t. The first observation Vs,0 is set to 1 for all stocks. 
 
From the normalized value series each stock is matched with closest pair based on sum of 
daily squared deviations calculated from the difference of the two stocks’ series. Each stock is 
matched with a pair that minimizes the sum of squared deviations. Sum of squared deviations 
is calculated as shown in equation 2: 
                   SSDp = ∑(Va,t – Vb,t)
2
 ,   (2) 
where SSDp is the sum of squared residuals for pair p formed from stocks a and b. The 
matching process results in a vast number of tested pairs. 120 individual stocks form 7 140 
potential pairs calculated with equation 3: 
 np = ns (ns – 1) / 2 ,                                          (3) 
where np is the number of unique pairs and ns is the number of single stocks. Each stock is 
matched with a closest peer resulting in the same number of pairs that we have stocks. These 
pairs are ranked on the sum of squared deviations and 20 pairs with smallest sums of squared 
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deviations are selected for trading. These pairs represent the closest pairs in the data. A single 
stock is limited to belong to only one pair. This is done to diversify idiosyncratic risk of 
having the same stock in multiple pairs. 
 
4.2.2. Pairs trading technique 
After the 20 closest pairs are formed, they are traded for the following 6-month period. 
Trading is based on value series’ differences during the trading period and standard deviations 
of the differences measured during the formation period. The normalized value series are 
continued to the trading period without renormalizing them in the beginning of the period. 
Hence, a pair trade may open instantly in the first day of the trading period. 
 
When the value series of a pair differ by more than two standard deviations, a trade is opened. 
The standard deviation is measured during the 12-month formation period and is kept 
constant for the whole trading period. A long position is taken in the relatively low valued 
stock and a short position in the relatively high valued stock in expectation of a convergence 
of the spread between the two value series. The long and short positions are of equal dollar 
amount and therefore the trade is self-financing as the positive cash flow from the short 
position finances the negative cash flow from the long position. When the value series 
converge back to equilibrium, the spread equals zero, the trade is closed and long position 
stock sold and short position stock bought. The spread, and thus the magnitude of the standard 
deviation, determines the maximum return from a trade. 
 
A pair may open and close multiple times in both directions during the trading period. If a 
pair is opened and does not converge during the trading period, the pair is closed on the last 
day of trading which may result in a profit or a loss. Another case when a pair may result in a 
loss is a delisting. If a stock in a pair that is open is delisted, the trade is closed on the day of 
the delisting using the delisting price. Correspondingly, if a stock in pair that is not open is 
delisted, that pair is not traded after the event. 
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Figure 1 provides an illustrative example of the statistical pairs trading. During the formation 
period the two value series experience only small deviations both showing clearly a rising 
trend. Due to only small differences the stocks are selected for trading with a small sum of 
squared deviations. Almost from the start of the trading period 2. January 2001 the value 
series start to deviate and trade is opened by buying RGS and selling short MDU. On 16. 
January the trade is closed and on 22. January another trade is opened in the other direction by 
buying MDU and selling short RGS. Altogether the pair is opened four times during the 
trading period. First three are profitable when the value series converge, but the last trade 
produces negative return when the value series diverge further after the trade is opened and 
eventually the trade is closed at a loss at the end of the trading period. 
 
 Figure 1 
Trading sample 
Figure 1 is an illustrative sample of the statistical pairs trading method. The figure shows the normalized value 
series set to start from value 1.0 of stocks MDU Resources Group (MDU) and RGS Energy Group (RGS) 
between January 2000 and June 2001. The third line alternating between values 0.8, 1.0 and 1.2 shows the status 
of the pairs trade. Value 1 denotes that a trade is not open and value 1.2 (0.8) denotes that a trade is open and 
MDU sold short (bought long) and RGS bought long (sold short). January-December 2000 is the formation 
period of the pair and January-June 2001 is the trading period. Vertical dashed line at 2. January 2001 indicates 
the starting point of the trading period. 
 
 
My sample spans from the beginning of year 2000 to the end of 2010. The sample includes 20 
formation and trading periods. The first formation period is from January 2000 to December 
2000 followed by a 6-month trading period from January 2001 to June 2001. The formation 
periods are staggered by 6 months the second period being from July 2000 to June 2001. 
0,8
1,0
1,2
1,4
1,6
1,8
2,0
2,2
30/03/2000 28/06/2000 26/09/2000 22/12/2000 26/03/2001 22/06/2001
MDU RGS
Trade open 
Trade closed 
Trade open 
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Formation periods are always followed by a 6-month trading period. Thus, 6-month trading 
periods run successively covering the complete period 2001-2010 without gaps or overlap. 
Figure 2 illustrates the alternation of formation and trading periods. This part differs slightly 
from Gatev et al. (2006). They form pairs on a one-month interval resulting in overlapping 
trading. Each month belongs to six different trading periods, because every month a new 6-
month trading period is initiated. Problem involved is that same stocks may be used 
simultaneously in same or different pairs, thus exaggerating the results and resulting in risks 
difficult to measure. The interpretation of results suffers. I employ sequential 6-month trading 
periods without overlapping trading, thus generating transparent results. 
 
Figure 2 
Formation and trading periods’ alternation 
Figure 2 shows the alternation of 12-month formation and 6-month trading periods. First formation period 
(1/2001) is the calendar year 2000 followed by the first trading period (1/2001) for the first half of calendar year 
2001. The second formation period (2/2001) lasts for the second half of calendar year 2000 to the first half of 
calendar year 2001, partly overlapping the first (1/2001) and the third (1/2002) formation periods. Second 
trading period (2/2001) is followed on the second half of calendar year 2001. Trading periods never overlap. The 
last formation period in the sample is from the second half of calendar year 2009 to the first half of calendar year 
2010 and the last trading period for the second half of calendar year 2010 ends the sample. 
 
Formation period 1/2001 1/2002 1/2003 1/2004 
  
2/2001 2/2002 2/2003 2/2004 
         
Trading period 
  
1/2001 2/2001 1/2002 2/2002 1/2003 2/2003 
         
 
                
Calendar year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 
 
4.2.3. Return calculation 
The percentage return to a self-financing portfolio is not unambiguous. A zero-cost portfolio 
does not have invested capital to be used in a return calculation. Often used are gross 
exposure, the long position or the margin required on the short position, but an established 
method has not been formed. I use the most conservative method for return calculation 
employing the gross exposure as the “investment”. 
 
33 
 
If 1 dollar position is taken in both the long and the short positions, then the gross exposure 
amounts to 2 dollars to which the returns are calculated. Gross exposure does not 
overestimate the returns and this method is also in line with the return calculations in Gatev et 
al. (2006) and Do and Faff (2010). Yu (2011) calculates returns to the long position which 
increases her comparable return, but she uses excess return to single stocks compared with 
market return which decreases her comparable return. Thus, Yu’s (2011) returns are not as 
comparable as those reported in Gatev et al. (2006) and Do and Faff (2010). 
 
Gatev et al. (2006) calculate monthly returns marked-to-market daily with cash flows 
reinvested during the trading period. As I am interested in single trades and how they compare 
with analyst recommendations, I will not calculate daily returns, but returns to single trades 
and from these results I derive the returns to single pairs and portfolios. The return to 
portfolio during the 6-month trading period enables comparison to the results of Gatev et al. 
(2006) and especially to Do and Faff (2010) who report their results with a 6-month view. 
 
Return to a single roundtrip pairs trade
1
 is calculated as the absolute dollar return to both long 
and short positions divided by the gross exposure calculated as the dollar amount invested in 
long position plus the dollar amount shorted. Return calculation to a single roundtrip trade is 
shown in equation 4: 
              ri = [(-Va,x + Va,z) + (Vb,x – Vb,z)] / (Va,x + Vb,x) ,  (4) 
where ri is the return from trade i, Va,x is the value of stock a bought at time x, Vb,x is the 
value of stock b shorted at time x and Va,z and Vb,z denote the values of stocks a and b at the 
time of closing the trade at time z. The dollar amounts invested in long and short positions are 
always equal. 
 
Return to a pair is calculated as the sum of returns of all trades executed during the trading 
period. Since the return to each trade is calculated similarly with the same gross exposure, the 
                                                          
1
 A roundtrip trade is defined as the opening of a pairs trade position and the closing of the position. A roundtrip 
trade includes 4 individual trades: 2 when opening the position by buying one stock and short selling other, and 
2 when closing the position by buying the shorted stock and selling the bought stock. 
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pair return calculation assumes no reinvestment of cash flows. The underlying assumption is 
that in every trade an investor wants to take the same magnitude of risk not overweighting 
trades in the end of a profitable trading period. Moreover, as the initial investment is zero and 
the invested capital can’t be measured, the amount of investment is ambiguous and cash flows 
do not matter for the gross exposure that can be taken. In a single pair the trades never overlap 
and the gross exposure is stagnant and the return to a pair is simply the sum of returns from 
all trades. 
 
Return to a whole portfolio of pairs during a 6-month trading period is calculated as the 
average of the returns to all pairs that were actually traded at least once during the trading 
window. The zero returns to pairs that were eligible for trading, but did not at any point differ 
by two standard deviations, are left out from the portfolio return calculation. Hence, return is 
calculated to invested capital, not committed capital, though the calculation assumes that 
capital is tied to a traded pair for the whole trading period. In reality trades last only a fraction 
of the trading period and also positive cash flows during the trading period could produce 
small risk-free return. Negative cash flows take always place at the end of a trading period, 
not during it.
2
 Hence, the return calculation still mildly underestimates returns to the strategy. 
 
The returns are calculated for long and short positions of similar dollar amounts and the 
strategy is self-financing. Therefore, the return is interpreted as abnormal return. Later on I 
use terms return, abnormal return and excess return interchangeably when returns to the 
strategy, single pairs or single pairs trades are in question. 
 
4.2.4. Analyst recommendations 
In order to study the effect of divergent analyst recommendations on the returns to the 
statistical trading strategy I separately analyze single analyst recommendations during the 
trading period for all 20 pairs that are eligible for trading. From the I/B/E/S Details 
Recommendations database I screen all recommendations for the 40 stocks forming the 20 
                                                          
2
 Negative cash flow during trading period may occur in a special case of a delisting of a stock in an open pair 
that results in a loss to the trade. 
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pairs for a period starting one month prior the beginning of the trading period up to the end of 
the trading period, a period of 7 months. Since a pair can be opened immediately at the 
beginning of the trading period, it is important to know the recommendations that have been 
announced immediately prior to trading. Therefore, I collect recommendations also one 
month prior to trading. 
 
Yu (2011) trades pairs of stocks that the same analyst on the exact same date gives divergent 
recommendations to. She uses divergent recommendations sell-hold, hold-buy and sell-buy. 
Strong sell and strong buy recommendations are included in sell and buy categories. An 
analyst is likely to follow fairly similar stocks, e.g. stocks in the same industry, and hence the 
stocks should be a good fit for pairs trading. Additionally, an analyst has only one 
macroeconomic and stock market view at a time. If recommendations for properly similar 
stocks diverge, it has to be because of idiosyncratic factors, not due to differences in 
macroeconomic or stock market views. Because similar stocks have similar market exposure, 
a pairs trade is market neutral. 
 
Since I analyze only 20 pairs for divergent analyst recommendations, not a whole market 
universe of stocks, I have to relax some of the constraints in the methodology by Yu (2011). I 
evaluate whether divergent recommendations are connected with the return to a statistical 
pairs trade. A statistical trade that is connected to divergent analyst recommendations is a 
trade that immediately prior or during the trade has earned opposing recommendations to the 
stocks from a single analyst. Recommendations do not have to be given on the same date or 
on the date the trade is opened, but a pair has to be issued divergent recommendations from a 
single analyst before or during the open trade in order for the divergent recommendations to 
have an effect on the return. If a trade is executed in the same direction as the divergent 
recommendations, i.e. the relatively favorably recommended stock is bought and the 
relatively unfavorably recommended stock is sold short, I call it according or accordingly to 
recommendations and if a trade is executed vice versa to an according to recommendations 
trade, i.e. the stock that is issued relatively favorable recommendation is shorted and the stock 
issued relatively unfavorable recommendation is bought, I call the trade as executed 
contrariwise or contrarily to recommendations. 
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As opposed to Yu (2011) I separate buy (sell) and strong buy (strong sell) recommendations 
as divergent recommendations. Brav and Lehavy (2003) find significant differences in 
abnormal returns to recommendation changes from hold to buy and from hold to strong buy. 
Hence, separating buy (sell) and strong buy (strong sell) recommendations can reveal more 
information in recommendations. 
 
My measure relaxes some issues of the divergent analyst recommendations methodology 
described by Yu (2011) in order to be applicable to a smaller set of stocks with predetermined 
pairs. The measure still captures all essential economic factors in the methodology. Only 
recommendations from same analysts are used to include the market neutrality aspect. Even 
though the divergent recommendations are not given on the same exact date, they are still 
given during a relatively short window, and as noted in Elton et al. (1986), Womack (1996) 
and Jegadeesh et al. (2004) the stock price drift after recommendation announcements is 
likely to affect the returns for up to 6 months after the announcement. In addition, Da and 
Schaumburg (2011) find that reaction to analysts’ target price announcements does not need 
to be exactly on the date of the announcement to benefit from the information. Practically my 
measure is credible since often new recommendations follow earnings announcements which 
are not likely to be given on the same date by two companies in a pair, but they are likely to 
be given during a relatively short period, since most companies have the calendar year as their 
financial year and quarterly reporting is close to simultaneous. The information analysts 
obtain from these announcements are vital for the recommendations and making inter-
company differences between companies in the same industry. My measure captures the 
relevant theoretical and practical issues for the study. 
 
5. Empirical results 
This section presents the empirical findings of the study. Conclusions to proposed hypotheses 
and links to existing literature are provided. Results of statistical pairs trading are presented 
first followed by analysis on analyst recommendations and linking divergent 
recommendations to statistical trading. 
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5.1. Statistical pairs trading 
Table 2 reports descriptive results for the statistical trading. The results support the previous 
findings by Gatev et al. (2006) and Do and Faff (2010) and conclude that the statistical pairs 
trading strategy created by Gatev et al. (1999) is still profitable. The 6-month excess return to 
the strategy is 0.75% statistically significant at the 10% level. I accept H1 at the 10% 
significance level that statistical pairs trading produces positive abnormal returns. 
 
Median return to the strategy is 0.97% which is higher than the mean return. In the strategy 
the maximum return a trade can yield is limited whereas stop-loss rules are not employed and 
minimum return is not limited. The highest return to a trade in the sample is 14.7% and the 
minimum -28.7%. The asymmetry translates into smaller mean return compared to the median 
which is present throughout the results especially in Tables 6-11 where single trades are 
studied. 
 
 Average return to a pair generating positive return is 5.35% and to a pair generating negative 
return -5.40%. 40.75% of all pairs produce negative return, 55% positive return and 4.25% do 
not deviate enough for trading during the trading period. Average return to a single positive 
trade is 3.59% and to a negative trade -4.80% (not reported). The results reflect the structure 
of the trading where a pair can only be traded once if the first trade is negative, but multiple 
times if the trades are positive. Therefore the average return to a positive return pair is higher 
than average return to a positive return trade. 
 
Pairs are strongly correlated in the formation period, but the relationship partly breaks in the 
trading period. Mean correlation in the formation period is 0.85. Correlation in the trading 
period is lower mean being 0.57. Sum of squared deviations is an effective pairs formation 
method also from correlation point of view as the mean correlation of all potential pairs in 
formation period is 0.40 which is 0.45 lower than the mean of selected top 20 pairs. The top 
pairs chosen do exhibit some persistence in correlation as the trading period mean is 0.57 
which is 0.21 above the mean correlation of all potential pairs in trading period of 0.36. 
Hence, the matching method is efficient also when examining correlations. Formation period 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for statistical pairs trading 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the statistical trading strategy. First three columns report results for 
trading periods and next four columns for individual pairs. t-statistic shows the level of significance at which the 
mean return is different from zero. Correlations are between the returns of stocks forming a pair for the top 20 
pairs. 
 
    
Periods 
  
Pairs 
  
  
All 
Positive 
return 
Negative 
return 
  All 
Positive 
return 
Negative 
return 
Zero-
trade 
Number of periods / pairs 20 15 5 
 
400 220 163 17 
 
% of all observations 100 % 75 % 25 % 
 
100 % 55.0 % 40.8 % 4.3 % 
Return 
        
 
Mean 0.75 % 1.67 % -2.00 % 
 
0.74 % 5.35 % -5.40 % na. 
 
Median 1.0 % 1.2 % -2.0 % 
 
0.8 % 4.0 % -4.4 % na. 
 
Maximum 5.7 % 5.7 % -1.1 % 
 
37.6 % 37.6 % -0.04 % na. 
 
Minimum -3.0 % 0.3 % -3.0 % 
 
-25.5 % 0.03 % -25.5 % na. 
 
Standard deviation 2.0 % 1.4 % 0.8 % 
 
7.1 % 5.0 % 4.9 % na. 
 
t-statistic 1.64 * na. na. 
 
2.08 ** na. na. na. 
Number of traded pairs 
        
 
Mean 19.2 19.3 18.8 
 
na. na. na. na. 
 
Median 20 19 20 
 
na. na. na. na. 
 
Maximum 20 20 20 
 
na. na. na. na. 
 
Minimum 16 18 16 
 
na. na. na. na. 
 
Standard deviation 1.1 0.8 1.8 
 
na. na. na. na. 
Number of roundtrip trades 
        
 
Mean 30.6 32.5 24.8 
 
1.5 2.0 1.1 na. 
 
Median 29 32 26 
 
1 2 1 na. 
 
Maximum 61 61 34 
 
10 10 4 na. 
 
Minimum 17 24 17 
 
0 1 1 na. 
 
Standard deviation 8.9 8.8 6.9 
 
1.0 1.2 0.4 na. 
Pairwise return correlation in 
formation period 
       
 
Mean na. na. na. 
 
0.85 0.86 0.84 0.81 
 
Median na. na. na. 
 
0.89 0.90 0.89 0.87 
 
Maximum na. na. na. 
 
0.99 0.99 0.99 0.96 
 
Minimum na. na. na. 
 
-0.61 -0.61 0.28 0.16 
 
Standard deviation na. na. na. 
 
0.15 0.15 0.14 0.21 
Pairwise return correlation in 
trading period 
       
 
Mean na. na. na. 
 
0.57 0.62 0.49 0.79 
 
Median na. na. na. 
 
0.72 0.75 0.67 0.89 
 
Maximum na. na. na. 
 
0.98 0.98 0.96 0.97 
 
Minimum na. na. na. 
 
-0.83 -0.71 -0.83 0.00 
 Standard deviation na. na. na.  0.38 0.35 0.41 0.26 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level; * Statistically significant at the 10% level 
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correlations are not materially different between pairs that yield positive return and pairs that 
yield negative return. 
 
Lower correlation during trading period enables large enough deviations to make profitable 
trades. In fact, it can even be necessary for trading. In my sample zero-trade pairs show as 
strong correlation during trading period as during formation period. Keeping in mind that the 
method for pairs matching is not correlation, but sum of squared deviations, the correlations 
during formation period are very strong. In a volatile sideways market without a descending 
or ascending trend the correlation between a pair can be large and negative when the stock 
series frequently cross and produce a low sum of squared deviations. These cases decrease the 
mean correlation. When the deviations are high enough, but not too high, these pairs produce 
the best trading results. In my sample zero-trade pairs never have negative correlations. 
 
In Table 3 I report trading results divided into trading periods. Differences in characteristics 
between trading periods with positive and trading periods with negative returns are small. 
Mean number of roundtrip trades is higher for positive return periods (32.5) than for negative 
return periods (24.8). This is an intuitive result, because the number of negative return trades 
for each period is limited to 20, whereas the number of positive trades does not have a limit. 
Naturally a higher number of trades imply that the increase in trades is mainly from the 
increase in positive trades. The numbers of positive and negative trades confirm that the 
higher number of trades for positive return periods is in fact due to increase in positive return 
trades, not due to decrease in negative return trades. 
 
Major difference between negative and positive return trading periods is return during 
formation period. Return all sample stocks during formation period is 10.3 %-points higher 
for trading periods with positive return (14.6%) than for trading periods with negative return 
(4.3%). Single extreme observations do not explain the difference. One plausible explanation 
could be that pairs that are formed during an up market are formed on the basis of 
fundamentals and thus have a strong relationship, whereas pairs formed in down market do 
not follow fundamentals as strictly. Karlsson, Loewenstein and Seppi (2009) find that
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics for statistical pairs trading by trading periods 
Table 3 shows results of the statistical trading divided into trading periods for the whole sample period from year 2000 to 2010. Notation 1/2001 denotes trading period that 
lasts for the first half of year 2001 and notation 2/2001 denotes trading period that lasts for the second half of year 2001, etc. Columns 1-3 report results for the statistical 
trading. Columns 4-7 report results for all sample stocks during formation and trading periods. Last two columns report mean correlations between returns to two stocks that 
form a pair in the top 20 pairs. 
 
  
Pairs 
trading 
return 
Number 
of traded 
pairs 
Number of 
roundtrip 
trades 
Mean formation 
period return for 
sample stocks 
Mean formation 
period volatility for 
sample stocks 
Mean trading 
period return for 
sample stocks 
Mean trading 
period volatility 
for sample stocks 
Pairwise 
correlation 
on formation 
period 
Pairwise 
correlation 
on trading 
period 
1/2001 2.56 % 20 35 44.3 % 41.5 % 9.0 % 26.8 % 0.83 0.26 
2/2001 2.82 % 19 29 39.8 % 38.6 % -3.3 % 23.9 % 0.83 0.38 
1/2002 -2.99 % 18 19 2.3 % 38.7 % -2.1 % 22.9 % 0.67 0.49 
2/2002 2.73 % 19 35 -3.0 % 33.8 % -13.8 % 41.9 % 0.82 0.51 
1/2003 1.22 % 19 26 -10.7 % 47.2 % 18.7 % 24.3 % 0.78 0.75 
2/2003 1.76 % 18 29 -0.2 % 47.4 % 15.5 % 20.0 % 0.84 0.48 
1/2004 0.30 % 20 24 38.1 % 29.5 % 4.3 % 15.4 % 0.94 0.47 
2/2004 1.77 % 18 35 20.3 % 24.7 % 14.6 % 16.5 % 0.88 0.80 
1/2005 -1.13 % 20 28 20.3 % 23.3 % 11.9 % 16.7 % 0.89 0.73 
2/2005 1.12 % 19 34 28.9 % 23.9 % 0.6 % 18.7 % 0.91 0.59 
1/2006 -2.59 % 20 26 13.7 % 25.6 % 8.8 % 17.3 % 0.88 0.14 
2/2006 0.99 % 20 32 11.7 % 25.9 % 15.4 % 13.9 % 0.81 0.78 
1/2007 0.95 % 20 32 25.5 % 22.3 % 5.3 % 16.0 % 0.92 0.63 
2/2007 0.92 % 20 35 21.4 % 22.4 % 2.7 % 22.6 % 0.89 0.47 
1/2008 -1.97 % 20 34 8.3 % 27.9 % -4.8 % 23.0 % 0.84 0.66 
2/2008 5.66 % 20 61 -0.9 % 31.0 % -20.2 % 48.2 % 0.81 0.70 
1/2009 1.51 % 20 29 -24.3 % 51.9 % -0.2 % 32.3 % 0.87 0.63 
2/2009 -1.34 % 16 17 -23.1 % 60.0 % 16.8 % 21.6 % 0.90 0.65 
1/2010 0.31 % 18 24 16.9 % 39.2 % -4.8 % 20.5 % 0.89 0.63 
2/2010 0.43 % 19 28 11.2 % 28.3 % 17.9 % 17.0 % 0.80 0.71 
        
Continued 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Descriptive statistics for statistical pairs trading by trading periods 
 
  
Pairs 
trading 
return 
Number 
of traded 
pairs 
Number of 
roundtrip 
trades 
Mean formation 
period return for 
sample stocks 
Mean formation 
period volatility for 
sample stocks 
Mean trading 
period return for 
sample stocks 
Mean trading 
period volatility 
for sample stocks 
Pairwise 
correlation 
on formation 
period 
Pairwise 
correlation 
on trading 
period 
Mean 0.75 % 19.2 30.6 12.0 % 34.1 % 4.6 % 23.0 % 0.85 0.57 
Median 0.97 % 20 29 12.7 % 30.2 % 4.8 % 21.1 % 0.85 0.63 
Standard 
deviation 
2.05 % 1.1 8.9 19.1 % 11.0 % 10.8 % 8.8 % 0.06 0.17 
Correlation with 
trading return 
na. 0.19 0.74 0.10 0.04 -0.34 0.59 0.04 0.13 
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investors are not as attentive in down market and hence stock price movement does not follow 
fundamentals as strictly as in up market. This observation is reflected in the formed pairs. 
 
The explanation would require that the trading period is also an up market period and stocks 
would be traded according to their fundamentals, not in panic in down market when the 
fundamentals do not perhaps matter as much as in up market. However, the mean return for 
trading periods where both formation and trading are up market periods is lower (0.53%) than 
for other periods (0.98%). A counter argument would be that in up market trading periods 
investors are well aware of the fundamental relationships between stocks and do not let a pair 
diverge enough for profitable pairs trading.The correlation between pairs trading returns and 
general market volatility during trading period is positive 0.60 indicating that higher volatility 
generates more profitable divergence-convergence opportunities for pairs trading. Mean 
return to trading periods when volatility during formation is below (above) average and 
during trading above (below) average is 2.16% (-0.56%) indicating that when pairs are 
formed in low volatility environment, the two standard deviation trading limits are small and 
high volatility in trading period breaches the limits multiple times for profitable pairs trading. 
Vice versa, when formation volatility is high and trading volatility low, profitable 
opportunities for pairs trading are scarce. Returns to cases where volatility in both formation 
and trading period is above or below average are 2.03% and 0.31%, between the former two 
extremes. In general, results show that high volatility is better for pairs trading than low 
volatility. 
 
5.1.1. Comparison to earlier research 
I find abnormal return of 0.75% for a 6-month trading period. The excess return is lower than 
found by Gatev et al. (2006) for utility stocks between 1962 and 2002, 6.50%. However, the 
excess return is in line with the more recent study by Do and Faff (2010) who find a 6-month 
excess return for utilities of 1.08% during 2003-2008. Hence, my results support the finding 
that excess returns to the pairs trading strategy are smaller in more recent years. The period 
under study is, however, too short to provide evidence of the diminishing returns in time. The 
effect is small and statistically not significant. 
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Gatev et al. (2006) attribute diminishing returns to increased trading and hedge fund activity 
that compete away the excess profits. Do and Faff (2011) offer an alternative explanation that 
the declining returns are because of increasing amount of pairs that do not converge after 
divergence. My results show evidence of both effects. Figure 3 shows the proportions of 
positive and negative return and zero-trade pairs through all periods and mean returns to 
positive and negative return pairs through all periods. Average returns to positive and 
negative return pairs have both moved closer to zero. During the first ten trading periods 
mean return to positive pairs is 5.2% and to negative pairs -6.2%. During the ten last periods 
returns are 5.1% and -4.9%. The closing on zero for both positive and negative return pairs 
shows a decline in the spreads between stocks in a pair which is evidence of the effect of 
increased trading suggested by Gatev et al. (2006). The effect is not statistically significant, 
however. 
 
The average proportion of positive return pairs during first ten trading periods is 58.0% and 
proportion negative return pairs 37.0%. For last ten trading periods proportions are 52.0% 
positive and 44.5% negative return pairs. The change is statistically significant at the 10% 
level and is evidence of the increasing amount of pairs that never converge as suggested by 
Do and Faff (2010). Which of the effects has had more impact on the returns to the whole 
statistical pairs trading strategy is out of the scope of this study. 
 
Trading returns and characteristics in my sample are very similar to earlier studies. The 
closest comparison can be found in a study by Do and Faff (2010) where they report trading 
results to top 20 pairs of utility stocks during 2003-2008. Mean and median 6-month excess 
returns to the strategy were 1.08% and 0.96% significant at the 1% level. My corresponding 
figures are 0.75% and 0.97% significant at the 10% level when examining trading periods. 
Portion of negative return trading periods in Do and Faff (2010) is 41% and in my study 25%. 
On pair level the mean 6-month excess return in Do and Faff (2010) is 1.19% and standard 
deviation 7.35%. My return is somewhat lower, a mean 6-month excess return of 0.74% and a 
standard deviation of 7.12%. Average sum of squared deviations of top 20 pairs during 
formation is 17% higher in my sample than in Do and Faff (2010). 
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Figure 3 
Distribution of positive and negative returns and positive and negative 
return pairs by periods 
Figure 3 shows on the left axis the numbers of positive return, negative return and zero-trade pairs in all 20 6-
month trading periods (bars). On the right axis the figure shows mean returns to positive return and negative 
return pairs in all trading periods (dashed lines). Notation 1/2001 denotes trading period that lasts for the first 
half of year 2001 and notation 2/2001 denotes trading period that lasts for the second half of year 2001, etc. 
 
 
 
Gatev et al. (2006) report descriptive trading results. For top 20 pairs of utility stocks during 
1962-2002 portion of trading periods with negative return is 19%. For the top 20 pairs of all 
stocks during 1962-2002 average number of pairs that were actually traded during a 6-month 
trading period is 19.3 and the average number of roundtrip trades per pair is 1.96. My results 
are very similar. Average number of traded pairs is 19.2 and average number of roundtrip 
trades per pair 1.53, somewhat lower than in Gatev et al. (2002), which is also a sign about 
the declining profits to the strategy. 
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5.1.2. Transaction costs 
When evaluating results from market data one needs to assess the potential effects that market 
frictions have on the results. In a trading strategy the effects are related to transaction costs. In 
a contrarian long-short strategy the specific variables are brokers’ commissions, bid-ask 
spread and restrictions on short-selling. 
 
Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) estimate that brokers’ commissions for a one-way transaction 
during 1982-1986 amount to approximately 1.41%. Jones (2002) provides a more recent 
estimate of 0.10% in year 2000 for NYSE listed stocks. The average number of roundtrip 
trades for a pair during six months in our sample is 1.53 and each roundtrip includes 4 one-
way trades. Therefore brokers’ commissions total 0.61% (1.53 ∙ 4 ∙ 0.10%) for pair during six 
months of trading. Excess return after commissions to the strategy equals 0.14%. Even though 
the strategy is not trading intensive, the commissions swipe a large share of profits. 
 
Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) find an average 1.64% bid-ask spread for stocks in NYSE and 
AMEX. Jones (2002) estimates a spread of approximately 0.20% for Dow Jones stocks in 
year 2000. The spread is larger for small capitalization stocks than for large stocks as shown 
in Stoll and Whaley (1982) and more recently in Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999). My 
sample consists of utility stocks that are larger than the average stocks and hence the bid-ask 
spread is likely to be smaller than average. The trading strategy I analyze demands liquidity 
and is therefore likely to pay the spread when trading. Moreover, the strategy is contrarian 
and when using closing prices the results are likely to be biased upward due to the bid-ask 
bounce as pointed out in Conrad and Kaul (1993) and Stoll and Whaley (1982). The strategy 
sells stocks that have appreciated and buys stocks that have depreciated compared to their 
pair. Hence the strategy is more likely to sell an absolute winner and buy an absolute loser. 
The closing price of the winner is more likely to be an ask price and the loser’s a bid price. By 
using closing prices the strategy implicitly sells stocks at the higher ask price and buys stocks 
at the lower bid price. Since the strategy demands liquidity, in practice it is more likely to 
trade at the opposite prices: sell at the lower bid price and buy at the higher ask price. 
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Gatev et al. (2006) estimate the effect of the bid-ask bounce on the results by delaying the 
execution of the trades by one day. When the signal for opening a trade is observed on day t0 
the trade is opened on day t1 and the closing of the trade is delayed similarly unless it is the 
last day of the trading period in which case the trade is closed on that day. Table 4 presents 
descriptive results for the statistical trading when the execution is delayed by one day. The 
excess 6-month return drops by 0.38 %-points from 0.74% to 0.36%. The excess return of 
0.36% is not statistically significant. The 0.38 %-points decrease in return means a bid-ask 
spread of 0.06% (0.38% / (1.53 ∙ 4)) for a one-way trade which is smaller than estimated in 
earlier studies. The smallest comparable bid-ask spread documented is 0.09% for stocks with 
a price per share of larger than 10$ in Conrad and Kaul (1993). A reliable estimate of the 
spread for the sample period is not available and reasons for the smaller estimated spread 
could be continuation in the decline in spreads or smaller than average spreads in my sample 
stocks because of the relatively large size. 
 
Table 4 
Descriptive statistics for statistical trading with one day delay in trade 
execution 
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for the statistical trading strategy when execution of trades, opening and 
closing, is delayed by one day with respect to the opening and closing signals.  First three columns report results 
for trading periods and next four columns for individual pairs. t-statistic shows the level of significance at which 
the mean return is different from zero. 
 
    
Periods 
  
Pairs 
  
  
All 
Positive 
return 
Negative 
return 
  All 
Positive 
return 
Negative 
return 
Zero-
trade 
Sample 20 15 5 
 
400 215 168 17 
 
% of all observations 100 % 75 % 25 % 
 
100 % 55.0 % 40.8 % 4.3 % 
Return 
        
 
Mean 0.36 % 1.14 % -1.96 % 
 
0.36 % 4.87 % -5.38 % na. 
 
Median 0.67 % 1.01 % -1.83 % 
 
0.47 % 3.75 % -4.20 % na. 
 
Standard deviation 1.66 % 1.00 % 0.68 % 
 
6.80 % 4.52 % 4.99 % na. 
  t-statistic 0.99 na. na.   1.06 na. na. na. 
 
 
Gatev et al. (2006) find that 6-month excess return to the strategy drops by 3.25 %-points 
when the execution of the trades is delayed by one day. Do and Faff (2010) execute the same 
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analysis and find a drop in 6-month excess return of 2.40 %-points. The estimate of spread in 
my sample is smaller than in either of the two earlier studies which I attribute to the 
differences in sample periods. My sample spans from 2000 to 2010 whereas Gatev et al. 
(2006) and Do and Faff (2010) use a sample starting from 1962. Bid-ask spreads in earlier 
years were significantly larger than in my sample as illustrated in Jones (2002). Da and 
Schaumburg (2011) note that decimalization in NYSE and NASDAQ in 2001, the first year of 
trading in my sample, increased liquidity and reduced most trading costs significantly. 
 
D’Avolio (2002) studies the characteristics of U.S. short-selling markets between years 2000 
and 2001. He finds that 16% of stocks in CRSP database are impossible to borrow, but these 
stocks comprise only less than 0.6% of total market value meaning that the stocks are 
generally very small and illiquid. Hence, the constraint is not likely to affect my results. The 
borrowing cost for 91% of stocks is on average 0.17% per annum and the rest of the stocks 
are so called market specials with higher borrowing costs. The probability of being a market 
special decreases with size and institutional holding which are both high for my sample of 
utility stocks. The average time a trade is open is also short and hence the total costs of short-
selling are very small, less than 0.06% for six months. 
 
Examining the transaction costs reveals that the strategy would not survive all transaction 
costs. Brokers’ commissions are high compared to returns and return after allowing for bid-
ask spread is not statistically significant. Short-selling costs are only a minor addition to the 
costs of the whole trading strategy. The results raise same question that Gatev et al. (2006) 
already asked about trading too small deviations not allowing for the transaction costs even if 
the trade is successful. One fact biasing return downwards is excessive trading that takes 
place when a trade is opened at the very end of a trading period not allowing enough time for 
the stocks to converge. Reason why Gatev et al. (2006) and Do and Faff (2010) find the 
strategy profitable even after accounting for transaction costs is that the strategy itself was 
more profitable in earlier years, whereas my sample covers only a recent period when the 
returns have already mostly diminished. 
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5.2. Analyst recommendations 
5.2.1. Distribution of recommendations 
The distribution of analyst recommendations is skewed towards buy and strong buy 
recommendations and has a large mass on hold recommendations. Figure 4 presents 
distribution of the recommendations. The distribution is in line with earlier studies’ 
observations and analysts’ bias to issue buy recommendations. For example Elton et al. 
(1986), Barber et al. (2001) and Brav and Lehavy (2003) report similar distributions. 55% are 
hold recommendations, 38% buy or strong buy and 7% sell or strong sell recommendations. 
The numerical scale of recommendations in I/B/E/S is reversed strong buy obtaining the 
smallest value and strong sell largest. Strong buy recommendations are given a value of 1, 
buy value of 2, hold value of 3, sell value of 4 and strong sell recommendations a value of 5. 
 
Figure 4 
Distribution of recommendations 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of recommendations. Left axis shows the number of recommendations in each 
category. In the analysis strong buy corresponds to value 1, buy to value 2, hold to value 3, sell to value 4 and 
strong sell to value 5. 
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Mean of all recommendations in my sample is 2.55 and mean recommendation for trading 
period is higher than 3 only once in the 20 periods. Boni and Womack (2006) report mean 
consensus rating for all stocks of close to 2. Left skewed distribution characterizes aptly the 
positive bias in analyst recommendations. 
 
5.2.2. Investment value in analyst recommendations 
To study analysts’ recommendation accuracy I compare consensus trading period 
recommendations to each stock with the stocks return during the period. I test analysts’ 
abilities to distinguish between stocks that perform better than average versus those that 
perform worse than average. Relative recommendation ability I test with consensus 
recommendations between stocks in pairs formed in statistical trading. 
 
The data contains a total of 3 126 recommendations for 40 utility stocks for 20 trading periods 
on a total of 10 years period. The average number of recommendations issued for a stock 
during 7-months starting one month prior to trading is 3.9. My default assumption in 
analyzing divergent recommendations is that analysts’ relative recommendations are accurate. 
 
Table 5 shows the statistics for correct level and relative recommendations. First column 
shows the proportion of correct recommendations for period when the benchmark is the mean 
return of sample stocks during the trading period. Buy (Sell) consensus recommendations on 
stocks that return above (below) the sample mean are considered correct. The consensus 
recommendation is defined as buy (sell) when the mean recommendation is a value below 
(above) 3. I eliminate consensus recommendations that take the value of exactly 3 
corresponding to a hold recommendation. The meaning and correctness of hold 
recommendations is not unequivocal. 
 
Mean proportion of correct level recommendations is 52.8%. The proportion is above 50% at 
the 10% statistical significance level. Hence, it seems that analysts have a weak ability to 
issue correct recommendations within an industry. The marginally above 50% rate of correct 
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Table 5 
Percentages of correct level and relative recommendations 
Table 5 shows statistics for correct recommendations on trading periods. Proportions in the first column are 
calculated from consensus recommendations that can be identified as buy (mean recommendation below value 3) 
or sell (mean recommendation above value 3). Proportions in the second column are calculated from top 20 pairs 
that have differing mean recommendations for the stocks. First column shows the results when a buy (sell) 
recommendation is considered correct, if the return to stock is above (below) the period’s mean return calculated 
from all sample stocks. Second column shows the results when a recommendation is considered correct, if the 
stock that has the relatively more favorable recommendation in a pair earns higher return. t-statistic shows the 
level of significance at which the mean proportion of correct recommendations is different from 50%. 
 
      
Correct level 
recommendation compared 
to period mean return 
  
Correct relative 
recommendation 
between pair 
Number of stocks / pairs 
 
540 
 
278 
Proportion correct recommendations 
  
 
Mean 
 
52.8 % 
 
58.8 % 
 
Median 
 
54.8 % 
 
57.7 % 
 
Standard deviation 
 
8.0 % 
 
14.5 % 
 t-statistic (≠ 50%)   1.55 *   2.72 *** 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level; * Statistically significant at the 10% level 
 
 
recommendations does not seem to be economically satisfactory for an analyst, however. 
Furthermore, the correlation between consensus recommendations and stock returns (not 
reported) are very small indicating that analysts’ consensus level recommendations, even 
though correct on average on a two point buy/sell scale, are not particularly accurate 
throughout the whole recommendation scale of 1 through 5. 
 
More important than the results of level recommendations to my study is the performance of 
analysts’ relative recommendations between a pair of stocks. Second column in Table 5 
shows the results for analysts’ relative recommendations for a pair. Pairs are the ones formed 
in statistical pairs trading and the relative recommendations are evaluated only within a pair. 
If the stock in a pair that has the higher return has relatively more favorable consensus 
recommendation, the relative recommendation is correct. The mean proportion of correct 
relative recommendations is 58.8%. The proportion is higher than 50% at the 1% statistical 
significance level. I accept hypothesis H2 that analysts’ relative recommendations have 
investment value. 
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Interestingly, analysts on average are better in picking a relative winner between a close pair 
of stocks than within an industry. The relative recommendations between a close peer are 
more informative than a comparison of recommendations within an industry which is often 
the case when analysts employ relative multiples-based valuation techniques. Correlation 
between difference in recommendations and difference in returns between stocks in a pair is   
-0.15, however. The magnitude of the difference in consensus recommendations is not 
correlated with the magnitude of return difference. Though the relative recommendations are 
correct on average, the magnitude of the difference in returns cannot be inferred from the 
magnitude of the difference in recommendations. The finding is not completely in line with 
Brav and Lehavy (2003) who show that the magnitude of change in recommendations is 
informative. One explanation is that the stocks in a pair are really close substitutes, because of 
which it is difficult for an analyst to give widely differing recommendations. 
 
Results show that on consensus level analysts have a weak ability to recommend winner 
stocks within an industry. Between two statistically close stocks analysts recommendation 
ability is, however, significantly better. Results about positive abnormal return to pairs trading 
and analysts’ significant ability to recommend the relative winner in a statistical pair 
underline the importance of the joint study. 
 
5.3. Divergent recommendations in pairs trading 
The finding that analysts do well in relative recommendations between a statistical pair 
advocates research on connections between pairwise relative recommendations and statistical 
pairs trading. Next I analyze this relationship between divergent recommendations and 
statistical pairs trading. While in the previous section relative recommendations were 
analyzed on consensus level, in this section divergent recommendations are by definition 
relative differing recommendations issued by a single analyst. 
 
Table 6 sums the effect that divergent recommendations have on pairs trading. Of all 612 
trades 112 are connected to divergent recommendations. Trades connected to divergent 
recommendations are trades that are issued divergent recommendations before or during the 
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trade as defined in section 4.2.4. Mean return to trades connected to divergent 
recommendations is -1.09% significant at the 5% level. Mean return to the 500 trades not 
connected to divergent recommendations is 0.85% significant at the 1% level. In aggregate 
divergent recommendations weaken the return to statistical pairs trading. The return of            
-1.09% is significantly different from the mean return to all trades of 0.49% at the 1% level. 
Proportion of negative return trades is much higher in trades connected to divergent 
recommendations than in trades not connected to divergent recommendations. 
 
Table 6 
Returns to trades by connection to divergent recommendations 
Table 6 shows return statistics for all trades in the first column, for trades that are connected to divergent 
recommendations in the second column and for trades that are not connected to divergent recommendations in 
the third column. Trades connected to divergent recommendations are trades that are issued divergent 
recommendations before or during the trade. t-statistics for mean returns are shown compared to 0% return and 
compared to the mean return to all trades of 0.49%. 
 
    
All trades 
Trades connected  
to divergent 
recommendations 
Trades not connected 
to divergent 
recommendations 
Number of trades 612 112 500 
% of all trades 100 % 18 % 82 % 
Return 
   
 
Mean 0.49 % -1.09 % 0.85 % 
 
Median 1.97 % -0.07 % 2.17 % 
 
Standard deviation 5.38 % 6.42 % 5.06 % 
 
t-statistic (≠ 0%) 2.26 ** -1.79 ** 3.74 *** 
 
t-statistic (≠ 0.49%) na. -2.60 *** 1.56 * 
     
Number of positive return trades 386 55 331 
% of observations 63 % 49 % 66 % 
Number of negative return trades 226 57 169 
% of observations 37 % 51 % 34 % 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level; * Statistically significant at the 10% level 
 
 
Rather than keeping relative prices in line, divergent recommendations, whether the cause or 
effect, are a sign of the relationship in pairs breaking up. Relationships hold best in pairs that 
do not have divergent recommendations disturbing the markets. Divergent recommendations 
could be a sign of fundamental changes in the companies to which analysts react to. In that 
case the relationship is correctly broken up and contrarily in the lack of divergent 
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recommendations the estimated relationship holds creating opportunities for lucrative pairs 
trading. This reasoning is in line with Papadakis and Wysocki (2008) who find that pairs 
trades opened after earnings announcements or analysts’ forecasts are less profitable than 
other trades. 
 
Negative return to trades connected to divergent recommendations as such does not guide to 
shirk or trace divergent recommendations. As H3 states, the negative returns to trades 
connected to divergent recommendations could be caused by a majority of trades where 
divergent recommendations are issued before the opening of the trade and trades where 
divergent recommendations are issued after the opening of the trade, but the statistical trade is 
executed contrariwise to the recommendations. In this case trades, where divergent 
recommendations contribute to the closing of the spread between two stocks, would account 
only for a small proportion of trades. In analyzing the accuracy or benefits of divergent 
recommendations we have to look at the timing of the recommendations as well as the 
execution of statistical pairs trades. 
 
5.3.1. Returns to trades connected to divergent recommendations 
Table 7 shows returns to trades connected to divergent recommendations divided by timing of 
recommendations and execution of trade. The proportions of trades where recommendations 
are issued before trade opening and after trade opening are close to equal. Also proportions of 
trades executed accordingly to recommendations and contrariwise to recommendations are 
equal. Mean return to trades in all four categories are negative. 
 
Mean return to trades where recommendations are issued before the opening of the trade is     
-0.53%. The return is not statistically significant. Insignificant negative return is an indication 
that after analysts issue divergent recommendations the spread between the pair widens up to 
the point where it reaches the limit to open a pairs trade. After the trade is opened the spread 
soon arrives at a new equilibrium state after which it stays stagnant. The chain of events leads 
to opening of pairs traded when the spread is still widening. The change is not temporary and 
thus returns to pairs trades are slightly negative. This inference is in line with studies by  
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Table 7 
Returns to trades connected to divergent recommendations by timing of recommendations and execution of trades 
Table 7 shows return statistics for trades that are connected to divergent recommendations. First column shows returns to all trades, second and third columns to trades where 
divergent recommendations are issued before and after opening of the trade and fourth and fifth columns to trades that are executed accordingly and contrariwise to 
recommendations. t-statistics for mean returns are shown compared to 0% return and compared to the mean return to all trades of 0.49%. 
 
    
Trades connected 
to divergent 
recommendations 
  
Trades where 
recommendations issued 
before trade opening 
Trades where 
recommendations issued 
after trade opening 
  
Trades executed 
accordingly to 
recommendations 
Trades executed 
contrariwise to 
recommendations 
Number of trades 112 
 
57 55 
 
54 58 
% of all trades 100 % 
 
51 % 49 % 
 
48 % 52 % 
Return 
     
  
 
Mean -1.09 % 
 
-0.53 % -1.66 % 
 
-0.48 % -1.65 % 
 
Median -0.07 % 
 
-0.05 % -0.23 % 
 
0.65 % -0.37 % 
 
Standard deviation 6.42 % 
 
6.53 % 6.31 % 
 
6.12 % 6.69 % 
 
t-statistic (≠ 0%) -1.79 ** 
 
-0.62 -1.95 ** 
 
-0.58 -1.88 ** 
 
t-statistic (≠ 0.49%) -2.60 *** 
 
-1.19 -2.53 *** 
 
-1.17 -2.44 *** 
       
  Number of positive return trades 55 
 
28 27 
 
30 25 
% of observations 49 % 
 
49 % 49 % 
 
56 % 43 % 
Number of negative return trades 57 
 
29 28 
 
24 33 
% of observations 51 % 
 
51 % 51 % 
 
44 % 57 % 
 
 
       
Number of trades executed accordingly to 
recommendations 
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23 31 
 
na. na. 
% of observations 48 % 
 
40 % 56 % 
 
na. na. 
Number of trades executed contrariwise to 
recommendations 
58 
 
34 24 
 
na. na. 
% of observations 52 %   60 % 44 %   na. na. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level Continued 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Returns to trades connected to divergent recommendations by timing of recommendations and execution of trades 
 
    
Trades connected 
to divergent 
recommendations 
  
Trades where 
recommendations issued 
before trade opening 
Trades where 
recommendations issued 
after trade opening 
  
Trades executed 
accordingly to 
recommendations 
Trades executed 
contrariwise to 
recommendations 
Number of trades with recommendations 
issued before trade opening 
57 
 
na. na. 
 
23 34 
% of observations 51 % 
 
na. na. 
 
43 % 59 % 
Number of trades with recommendations 
issued after trade opening 
55 
 
na. na. 
 
31 24 
% of observations 49 %   na. na.   57 % 41 % 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level 
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Womack (1996) and Jegadeesh et al. (2004) that stock price drift after new recommendations 
lasts for one to six months. 60% of trades are executed contrariwise to recommendations 
which advocates that the spread in fact widens to the direction that the recommendations 
indicate. Papadakis and Wysocki (2008) find contradictory results that analysts issue 
recommendations contrary to past returns and thus accelerate convergence of pairs. 
 
Return to trades where recommendations are issued after trade opening is -1.66% significant 
at the 5% level. Trades where recommendations are issued after trade opening contribute 
more to the aggregate negative return than trades where recommendations are issued before 
trade opening. The finding is unexpected since a majority of 56% of the trades are executed 
accordingly to recommendations. If the spread drifts according to recommendations, these 
trades yield positive returns when the recommendations cause the spread to narrow. 
Theoretical explanation is that, because negative return to a trade is not limited, but positive 
return is, the 44% of trades executed contrariwise to recommendations yield highly negative 
returns that outweigh the positive returns to the majority of trades executed accordingly to 
recommendations. Proportion of trades yielding positive returns is 49% against the proportion 
of 56% of trades that are executed accordingly to recommendations. Hence, at least some 
trades executed according to recommendations yield negative returns. This motivates an 
alternative explanation that the spread does not drift the way recommendations indicate, but it 
moves to the opposite direction causing negative returns to trades executed according to 
recommendations. The alternative explanation contradicts with theory and findings about 
post-recommendation drift. 
 
The distribution and returns to trades executed accordingly and contrariwise to 
recommendations are also interesting. Mean return to trades executed accordingly to 
recommendations is -0.48%. The return is not statistically significant. Mean return to trades 
executed contrariwise to recommendations is -1.65% which is significant at the 5% level. 
Trades executed contrariwise contribute more to the aggregate negative return than trades 
executed accordingly to recommendations. 59% of contrariwise executed trades are trades 
with recommendations issued before trade opening. Furthermore, 57% of trades yield 
negative returns. This observation strengthens the note that the spread opens in the direction 
recommendations indicate and continues to widen after a pairs trade is opened. 
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The results indicate that the largest contributor to the negative return are trades executed 
contrariwise to recommendations with recommendations issued after the opening of the trade. 
As discussed, however, there are various other possible explanations for the negative returns. 
A study about the distribution of accordingly and contrariwise executed trades in trades with 
recommendations issued before and after trade opening shows that the largest contributor is 
indeed contrariwise executed trades where recommendations are issued after trade opening. 
The effect from other trades is not unambiguous, however. 
 
5.3.2. Timing of recommendations and post-recommendations drift 
In trades where recommendations are issued before trade opening trades executed accordingly 
to recommendations yield a mean return of 0.00% and trades executed contrariwise yield a 
return of -0.89%. Neither of the returns is statistically significant. Table 8 shows returns to 
trades where recommendations are issued before trade opening divided into accordingly and 
contrariwise executed trades.  
 
Negative return to trades executed contrariwise reinforces the hypothesis that spread opens in 
the direction of recommendations and the drift continues slightly also after trade opening. 
Since the negative return is not statistically significant it seems that pairs reach a new 
equilibrium state close to the trigger point of opening trade and thus the spread moves only 
slightly after trade opening. 
 
The relatively high proportion of trades executed accordingly to recommendations is 
contradictory to the expected post-recommendations drift. In these trades between issue of 
recommendations and trade opening the spread moves in the opposite direction than the 
recommendations indicate. Mean return to trades is zero. After the recommendations the pair 
diverges to the opposite direction than recommendations indicate and reaches a new 
equilibrium at the opening of the trade, similarly as in trades executed contrariwise to 
recommendations. 
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Table 8 
Returns to trades where divergent recommendations are issued before the 
opening of the trade by execution of trades 
Table 8 shows return statistics to trades connected to divergent recommendations where recommendations are 
issued before the opening of the trade. First column shows returns to all trades and second and third to trades 
executed accordingly and contrariwise to recommendations. t-statistics for mean returns are shown compared to 
0% return and compared to the mean return to all trades of 0.49%. 
 
    
Trades where 
recommendations issued 
before trade opening 
Trades executed 
accordingly to 
recommendations 
Trades executed 
contrariwise to 
recommendations 
Number 57 23 34 
% of all trades 100 % 40 % 60 % 
Return 
   
 
Mean -0.53 % 0.00 % -0.89 % 
 
Median -0.05 % 1.85 % -0.13 % 
 
Standard deviation 6.53 % 6.60 % 6.55 % 
 
t-statistic (≠ 0%) -0.62 0.00 -0.80 
 
t-statistic (≠ 0.49%) -1.19 -0.36 -1.23 
     
Number of positive return trades 28 12 16 
% of observations 49 % 52 % 47 % 
Number of negative return trades 29 11 18 
% of observations 51 % 48 % 53 % 
 
 
The relatively high proportion of accordingly to recommendations executed trades and the 
statistical insignificance of returns are contrary to the expected post-recommendations drift. 
Even though results about trades executed contrariwise to recommendations indicate to the 
right direction, they are not strong enough to accept H3a that trades where recommendations 
are issued before the opening of the trade yield abnormal negative returns. I reject H3a because 
of the lack of statistical significance. 
 
Table 9 shows returns to the spread between issue of recommendations and trade opening. 
Mean return is -2.61% significant at the 1% level.
3
 The returns are similar to trades executed 
accordingly and contrariwise to recommendations. The drift causes the spread to cross trade 
                                                          
3
 7 observations yield positive returns between issue of recommendations and trade opening. In these 
observations recommendations have been issued before the beginning of the trading period or during preceding 
trade and therefore yield positive return. These observations are quirks due to the construction of the test, but 
because of low number and insignificant influence on results they have not been omitted from the study. 
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opening threshold on average 25 days after the issue of recommendations. In the following on 
average 45 days when the trade is open, the drift is dramatically smaller and statistically not 
significant. The post-recommendation drift occurring approximately during one month is in 
line with previous studies although in the shorter end of the range. 
 
The small negative return, though insignificant, to trades where recommendations are issued 
before trade opening indicates that an investor is better off when not investing in pairs which 
spread is opened after issue of divergent recommendations. Furthermore, it does not matter 
whether the spread opens in the direction of recommendations or in the opposite direction. 
Finding is in line with Engelberg et al. (2009) and indicates that recommendations reflect 
firm-specific information rather than industry information and thus relative recommendations 
between stocks within an industry are informative. 
 
Initial examination indicated that the largest contribution to the negative returns is from trades 
that are executed contrariwise to recommendations and where recommendations are issued 
after trade opening. Splitting trades into trades executed accordingly and contrariwise to 
recommendations confirms the observation. Table 10 shows returns to trades where 
recommendations are issued after trade opening divided into accordingly and contrariwise to 
recommendations executed trades. Return to trades executed accordingly is -0.84%, but not 
statistically significant. Return to trades executed contrariwise is -2.72% statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
 
Statistically significant negative return to trades executed contrariwise to recommendations 
confirms H3b that trades where divergent recommendations in the direction to widen the 
spread are issued after the opening of the trade yield abnormal negative return. Negative 
return to trades executed accordingly to recommendations is opposite to H3c that trades that 
after the opening of the trade receive divergent recommendations in the direction to close the 
spread yield abnormal positive return. I accept H3b and reject H3c. 
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Table 9 
Post-recommendations return drifts connected to divergent recommendations in trades where divergent 
recommendations are issued before the opening of the trade 
Table 9 shows return drifts after the issue of divergent recommendations and returns to trades in trades where divergent recommendations are issued before the opening of the 
trade.  Drift is calculated as the return of the spread between the issue of divergent recommendations and opening of the trade. Return of the spread is calculated in the same 
direction that the subsequent trade is executed. Drifts and returns are shown to all trades in the first two columns, to trades executed accordingly to recommendations in the 
second two columns and to trades executed contrariwise to recommendations in the last two columns. The first column shows the drift and the second return to the trades. t-
statistic shows the level of significance at which the mean proportion of correct recommendations is different from zero. 
 
    
Trades where recommendations issued 
before trade opening 
  
Trades executed accordingly to 
recommendations 
  
Trades executed contrariwise to 
recommendations 
    
Between issue of 
recommendations 
and trade opening 
Between trade 
opening and 
trade closing 
  
Between issue of 
recommendations 
and trade opening 
Between trade 
opening and 
trade closing 
  
Between issue of 
recommendations 
and trade opening 
Between trade 
opening and 
trade closing 
Return 
    
    
 
Mean -2.61 % -0.53 % 
 
-2.77 % 0.00 % 
 
-2.77 % -0.89 % 
 
Median -2.40 % -0.05 % 
 
-2.74 % 1.85 % 
 
-2.29 % -0.13 % 
 
Standard deviation 2.83 % 6.53 % 
 
2.56 % 6.60 % 
 
2.78 % 6.55 % 
 
t-statistic (≠ 0%) -6.97 *** -0.62 
 
-5.18 *** 0.00 
 
-5.81 *** -0.80 
       
   Number of positive return observations 7 28 
 
4 12 
 
3 16 
% of observations 12 % 49 % 
 
17 % 52 % 
 
9 % 47 % 
Number of negative return observations 50 29 
 
19 11 
 
31 18 
% of observations 88 % 51 % 
 
83 % 48 % 
 
91 % 53 % 
 
 
     
 
  
Mean duration in days 25 45   33 44   19 45 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level 
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Table 10 
Returns to trades where divergent recommendations are issued after the 
opening of the trade by execution of trades 
Table 10 shows return statistics to trades connected to divergent recommendations where recommendations are 
issued after the opening of the trade. First column shows returns to all trades and second and third to trades 
executed accordingly and contrariwise to recommendations. t-statistics for mean returns are shown compared to 
0% return and compared to the mean return to all trades of 0.49%.  
 
    
Trades where 
recommendations issued 
after trade opening 
Trades executed 
accordingly to 
recommendations 
Trades executed 
contrariwise to 
recommendations 
Number of trades 55 31 24 
% of all trades 100 % 56 % 44 % 
Return 
   
 
Mean -1.66 % -0.84 % -2.72 % 
 
Median -0.23 % 0.59 % -1.88 % 
 
Standard deviation 6.31 % 5.82 % 6.87 % 
 
t-statistic (≠ 0%) -1.95 ** -0.80 -1.94 ** 
 
t-statistic (≠ 0.49%) -2.53 *** -1.27 -2.29 ** 
     
Number of positive return trades 27 18 9 
% of observations 49 % 58 % 38 % 
Number of negative return trades 28 13 15 
% of observations 51 % 42 % 63 % 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level 
 
 
Negative return to contrariwise executed trades indicates that there is value in analyst 
recommendations. Contrarily, the negative, though not significant, return to accordingly 
executed trades signals that there is not value in recommendations. A closer study on returns 
to trades before the issue of recommendations and after the issue shows that analyst 
recommendations are in fact only a small contributor in the negative returns to trades 
executed contrariwise to recommendations.  
 
Table 11 shows returns to trades where recommendations are issued after the opening of the 
trade. The table divides returns to trades in two parts: return between trade opening and issue 
of recommendations and return between issue of recommendations and trade closing. Results 
show that negative return between trade opening and issue of recommendations is statistically 
significant in both accordingly and contrariwise executed trades, but between issue of 
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recommendations and trade closing positive return to trades executed accordingly and 
negative return to trades executed contrariwise are not statistically significant. 
 
Mean return to accordingly to recommendations executed trades between trade opening and 
issue of recommendations is -0.89% significant at the 10% level. Mean return between issue 
of recommendations and trade closing is 0.08% which is not statistically significant. Analysts 
issue recommendations in the direction to close the spread, but the spread does not converge. 
Time between recommendations issue and trade closing is on average 42 days during which 
the post-recommendation drift should be visible according to previous results. 
 
Return to contrariwise executed trades between trade opening and issue of recommendations 
is -1.99% significant at the 5% level. Return from issue of recommendations to trade closing 
is -0.48% which is not statistically significant. In this case analysts issue recommendations in 
the direction to widen the spread further. The drift follows recommendations, but it is small 
and statistically not significant. Time between issue of recommendations and trade closing is 
on average 46 days, again, enough to allow for a post-recommendation drift. Plausible 
explanation is a fundamental change in the pairs to which markets react faster than analysts in 
their recommendations. Average time between trade opening and issue of recommendations is 
40 days during which the return is -1.99%. Analysts seem to react to the change in the spread. 
Analysts notice the widening of the spread and assume a break up in the relationship between 
the pair and as a result issue divergent recommendations in the same direction the spread has 
moved. Negative return before issue of divergent recommendations yields most of the 
negative return to trades executed contrariwise to recommendations. Post-recommendations 
drift before closing the trades is only a small factor in the total negative return. 
 
A slight reaction to divergent recommendations by the spread is visible when return between 
issue of recommendations and trade closing in both accordingly and contrariwise trades is 
examined. In accordingly executed trades recommendations seem to constrain the diverging 
of the spread and in contrariwise executed trades they reinforce the diverging. However, the 
effect can’t be shown to be statistically significant. 
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Table 11 
Post-recommendations return drifts connected to divergent recommendations in trades where divergent 
recommendations are issued after the opening of the trade 
Table 11 shows returns to trades before the issue of divergent recommendations and return drift after the issue of divergent recommendations in trades where divergent 
recommendations are issued after the opening of the trade. Return is calculated between the opening of the trade and issue of divergent recommendations. Drift is calculated 
as the return of the spread between the issue of divergent recommendations and closing of the trade. Return of the spread is calculated in the same direction that the trade is 
executed. Returns and drifts are shown to all trades in the first two columns, to trades executed accordingly to recommendations in the second two columns and to trades 
executed contrariwise to recommendations in the last two columns. The first column shows the return between opening of trade and issue of divergent recommendations and 
the second drift between issue of divergent recommendations and closing of trade. t-statistic shows the level of significance at which the mean proportion of correct 
recommendations is different from zero. 
 
    
Trades where recommendations issued 
after trade opening 
  
Trades executed accordingly to 
recommendations 
  
Trades executed contrariwise to 
recommendations 
    
Between trade 
opening and issue of 
recommendations 
Between issue of 
recommendations 
and trade closing 
  
Between trade 
opening and issue of 
recommendations 
Between issue of 
recommendations 
and trade closing 
  
Between trade 
opening and issue of 
recommendations 
Between issue of 
recommendations 
and trade closing 
Return 
    
    
 
Mean -1.37 % -0.16 % 
 
-0.89 % 0.08 % 
 
-1.99 % -0.48 % 
 
Median -0.35 % 0.48 % 
 
-0.11 % 0.61 % 
 
-0.58 % 0.20 % 
 
Standard deviation 3.94 % 4.91 % 
 
2.95 % 5.64 % 
 
4.93 % 3.86 % 
 
t-statistic (≠ 0%) -2.58 *** -0.25 
 
-1.67 * 0.08 
 
-1.98 ** -0.61 
      
    Number of positive return observations 22 31 
 
14 18 
 
8 13 
% of observations 40 % 56 % 
 
45 % 58 % 
 
33 % 54 % 
Number of negative return 
observations 
33 24 
 
17 13 
 
16 11 
% of observations 60 % 44 % 
 
55 % 42 % 
 
67 % 46 % 
 
 
     
 
  
Mean duration in days 33 44   27 42   40 46 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level; * Statistically significant at the 10% level 
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Even though accepting H3b the conclusions about divergent recommendations are not 
expected. Recommendations are not the main driver of the return. Post-recommendation drift 
contributes less than one fifth of the negative return to contrariwise executed trades where 
recommendations are issued after trade opening. Moreover, the return between issue of 
recommendations and trade closing is statistically not significant. Hence, H3b is not accepted 
based on the reasons hypothesized, but due to other unexplained factors. 
 
5.3.3. Aggregate impact of divergent recommendations and implications on pairs trading 
Post-recommendation drift, which is a prerequisite for my hypotheses, is not significant in 
divergent recommendations. In trades where recommendations are issued after trade opening 
the drift is small and not statistically significant. In trades executed contrariwise to 
recommendations and recommendations are issued before trade opening the drift is according 
to recommendations and significant at the 1% level, but in trades executed according to 
recommendations the drift is opposite to recommendations and significant at the 1% level. 
Hence, on aggregate the drift does not evidence any dependence on divergent 
recommendations. 
 
Since divergent recommendations do not produce post-recommendation drift, the cause for 
statistically significant negative return to trades connected with divergent recommendations is 
not trades executed contrariwise to recommendations. In trades where recommendations are 
issued before trade opening the issue is followed by a drift according or opposite to 
recommendations which causes the opening of a pairs trade. The trades yield small 
statistically not significant negative return. In trades where recommendations are issued after 
trade opening most of the negative return is made between trade opening and issue of 
recommendations. Only small and statistically not significant part of return is made between 
issue of recommendations and closing of trade in trades that are executed contrariwise to 
recommendations. 
 
The only real effect that divergent recommendations have on the return is that when issued 
before trade opening, they are related to the breaking up of the pair which causes the spread to 
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widen. The divergence of pairs triggers a pairs trade based on the originally estimated 
relationship. When the relationship does not hold anymore, the trade makes a loss. Effectively 
divergent recommendations are related to the divergence of pairs which causes negative 
returns. The aggregate abnormal positive return to pairs trading is completely driven by pairs 
that are not issued divergent recommendations. 
 
Based on results the negative return to trades connected to divergent recommendations arises 
from two sources. Firstly from the unexplained breaking up of pairs before divergent 
recommendations are issued and secondly from the breaking up of pairs after issue of 
divergent recommendations. The first reason for break up is unexplained and analysts seem to 
react to the divergence in pairs. The second reason holds surprising information since pairs do 
not logically diverge in the direction of recommendations. Conclusion can be made that 
divergent recommendations are followed by divergence of the pair, but the recommendations 
do not hold any information about the direction. 
 
Divergent recommendations are related to the divergence of the pair, whether issued before or 
after the divergence. Results indicate that an investor is better off not trading in the presence 
of divergent recommendations. Pairs that open after issue of divergent recommendations 
should be avoided and pairs that gain divergent recommendations after opening should be 
closed immediately. Investors can only escape part of the losses, since approximately half of 
the pairs connected to divergent recommendations are issued recommendations after the pair 
has diverged. 
 
My results show that relative post-recommendation drift is not present in divergent 
recommendations. Results are contradictory with previous findings in Yu (2011). She finds 
that relative post-recommendation drift after the issue of divergent recommendations exists in 
pairs for 1, 3 and 6 months. She finds that the drift is large enough to be traded profitably. Yu 
(2011) trades divergence for up to six months whereas in my study I expect pairs to converge 
in short-term. According to trading divergence of the pair she finds that analyst 
recommendations are positively correlated with past stock price performance and thus 
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accelerate the divergence. My results are also different in this sense since a small majority of 
divergent recommendations are issued in the direction to narrow the spread. 
 
5.3.4. Difference in time preferences between statistical trading and analyst recommendations 
A possible cause for not finding post-recommendation drift related to statistical pairs trading 
is the difference in time preferences. Statistical trading is a short-term strategy with a trading 
period of 6-months whereas analyst recommendations are often issued for a minimum time of 
6 months, usually for one year. Average time a trade that is connected with divergent 
recommendations is open is 60 trading days matching to approximately 2.9 months. The time 
divergent recommendations are present is even lower, well below the recommendations’ time 
span. 
 
I test the difference in time spans by analyzing if the pairs that receive divergent 
recommendations are less often pairs in the following periods than pairs are on average. I 
include a group of pairs that receive only same recommendations from individual analysts in 
the tests. The group includes only pairs in which both stocks receive the same 
recommendations from the same analyst and do not receive divergent recommendations. 
Hypothesis is that these pairs would continue as pairs on a higher probability than pairs on 
average. Then pairs receiving divergent recommendations are actually diverging on the long-
term instead of being converging on the short-term as statistical trading requires. The 
hypothesis is in line with findings in Lehmann (1990) who shows that short-term stock price 
changes are not indicative for longer term price changes that follow fundamental information. 
Therefore, analyst recommendations that reflect long-term fundamental information should 
not be connected to short-term price fluctuations reviewed in statistical pairs trading. This 
would explain my result that relative post-recommendation drift is not significant in statistical 
pairs up to a period of two months. 
 
In my sample only 5.0% of all top 20 pairs are in the top 20 group also in the following 
formation period. Of pairs that receive divergent recommendations 4.4% continue as pairs and 
of pairs that receive same recommendations from individual analysts 7.5% continue as pairs. 
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The relations of the different groups indicate that the probability of continuing as a pair on the 
next period decreases if the pair receives divergent recommendations and increases if the pair 
receives same recommendations during trading. I further test the relation with a logit 
regression. Results show that the probability of being a pair in the next period decreases by 
15-20% through divergent recommendations and increases by approximately 40% through 
same recommendations depending on regression specifications, but in most cases the 
coefficients are not statistically significant. The sample with only 5% of changeless pairs is 
too small to draw statistically significant conclusions. 
 
The test structure is problematic since the persistence of pairs is studied with consecutive 
formation periods. As Figure 2 illustrates consecutive formation periods are actually 
overlapping by 6-months. Furthermore, the trading period during which divergent 
recommendations are issued overlaps with the final half of the second formation period. If 
recommendations are issued evenly during trading period, then the time recommendations can 
affect the pair during the second formation period is on average only a quarter of a year 
whereas pairs formation time before recommendation announcements on the second period is 
on average three quarters. 
 
To deal with the issue, instead of studying the directly following formation period, I skip the 
period and analyze the period after that (original formation period +2). In Figure 2 the first 
formation period 1/2001 is matched with formation period 1/2002. Hence, the periods do not 
have any overlap. Moreover, the trading period 1/2001 overlaps with formation period 
1/2002. The recommendations’ issue date is thus included in the second formation period 
ensuring that rapid effects in stock prices after recommendation announcements are included 
in the analysis. The stock prices have also on average three quarters to show the post-
recommendations drift and on average only one quarter of the second formation period takes 
place before recommendation announcements. 
 
Even a smaller percentage of top 20 pairs remain on the formation+2 period than on the 
straight consecutive formation period with 5% of changeless pairs. Therefore, instead of 
regressing the probability of being a pair, as dependent variable I use a sum of squared 
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deviations (SSD) ratio defined as the SSD of the pair on the formation+2 period divided by 
the average SSD of the top 20 pairs on that period. This affords me with a sample of 360 pairs 
with a non-binary dependent variable. Simple SSD is scaled to avoid the problem of high 
volatility periods with a large number of divergent recommendations dominating the 
regression. The final sample is 342 pairs, because 18 pairs are deleted from the data due to 
one or both stocks missing values on the formation+2 period. 
 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of SSD ratios for three pair categories: pairs receiving 
divergent recommendations, pairs receiving only same recommendations and pairs in which 
both stocks do not receive recommendations from the same analyst (neutral). The distribution 
shows that the observations for same category are smaller than for divergent or neutral pairs. 
Unexpectedly observations for divergent pairs are somewhat smaller than for neutral pairs. 
The data includes one outlier observation of SSD ratio of 904 for one divergent 
recommendation pair. The observation is omitted from Figure 5 as well as from regression 
analysis. 
 
Regression results show that same recommendations have a negative impact on the 
formation+2 period SSD ratio. Surprisingly also impact from divergent recommendations is 
negative. Impact from same recommendations is stronger than from divergent 
recommendations. Most significant explanatory variable is SSD ratio during the original 
formation period. The higher the original ratio is, the higher the formation+2 period ratio. 
When original formation period SSD ratio is included in the regression, other variables are 
not significant with most specifications. 
 
Pairs do not evidence consistent long-term post-recommendation drift after announcement of 
divergent recommendations. Hence, differences in time preferences do not explain the 
irrational post-recommendation drift observed in statistical pairs trades. Pairs that receive 
recommendations from a single analyst for both stocks, whether same or divergent, are closer 
than other pairs in the coming periods. Regression results are similar if absolute SSD, 
absolute change in SSD or percentage change in SSD is used as a dependent variable instead 
of the SSD ratio. 
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Figure 5 
Distribution of sum of squared deviations ratio by recommendations to pair 
group 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of sum of squared deviations (SSD) ratio by three pair groups: pairs that receive 
divergent recommendations during the original formation period (Divergent), pairs in which both stocks receive 
the same recommendations from the same analyst and do not receive divergent recommendations (Same) and 
pairs in which both stocks do not receive recommendations from the same analyst during the original formation 
period (Neutral). The period for which the SSD ratio is calculated is the original formation period +2. SSD ratio 
is calculated as the SSD of the pair divided by the average SSD of the top 20 pairs for the same period. One 
outlier observation of 904 for Divergent category is outside of the figure’s range. 
 
 
A plausible interpretation for the negative impact from divergent recommendations is that 
pairs, in which both stocks receive recommendations from the same analyst, are closer than 
neutral pairs that do not receive recommendations for both stocks from the same analyst. On 
average analysts follow a group of stocks. That group is formed on the basis of economics of 
scale of analyzing a single industry, close rivals or companies dependent on similar macro-
economic factors for example. Despite the recommendations are divergent, if two stocks in a 
pair receive recommendations from the same analyst, they are close enough pairs for an 
analyst to follow them in tandem. If on the other hand a pair does not receive 
recommendations for both stocks from the same analyst, analysts do not consider them close 
enough substitutes to be analyzed jointly. Divergent recommendations do not indicate as 
strong relation as same recommendations, however, and might even indicate that a former 
close pair is on its way to divergence in the future. 
 
 
0 50 100 150 200
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6. Conclusions 
In this thesis I examine the relation between statistical pairs and relative analyst 
recommendations with a U.S. stock and recommendation data over years 2000 to 2010. I 
conduct statistical pairs trading and match the trades with analyst recommendations. 
Specifically, I study whether statistical stock pairs are affected by the post-recommendations 
drift followed by divergent analyst recommendations between the stocks forming a pair. 
 
Motivation for the study rises mainly from three sources. First, statistical pairs trading is 
popular among practitioners and it has been found to generate positive excess returns also in 
several scientific studies without any of them yet to find an explanation for the abnormal 
returns. Second, relative analyst recommendations have been shown to provide valuable 
information and pairs trading based on analyst recommendations has been shown to produce 
positive abnormal returns. And third, statistical pairs trading and analyst recommendations 
have not yet been combined in studies even though the two share a large amount of similar 
qualities and analyst recommendations have been found to be connected with stock prices as 
well as fundamental information. 
 
In line with previous research I find statistical pairs trading to generate positive excess return. 
The return is smaller than in earlier papers, which is consistent with findings that excess 
return to the strategy is smaller in recent years. I also find support for both suggested reasons 
for the diminishing returns: increased pairs trading and hedge fund activity competing away 
the returns to arbitrageurs and an increasing number of pairs not converging back to 
equilibrium to enable profit, which signals an increasing fundamental risk in the trading 
strategy. Due to the smaller returns, the strategy does not survive an estimate of transaction 
costs unlike in previous papers. 
 
Consistent with earlier studies I find significant evidence that analyst recommendations on 
average do provide valuable information to investors. I find analysts being able to issue 
correct level recommendations as well as identify relative winners in pairs of stocks. Relative 
recommendations seem to be more valuable to an investor as opposed to simple level 
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recommendations, which is consistent with earlier findings and theory about bias in 
recommendations. Interestingly, I find relative recommendations between a statistically close 
stock pair being significantly more informative than relative recommendations within a whole 
industry. 
 
Pairs, in which the stocks receive divergent recommendations issued by the same analyst, 
yield negative return to pairs trading. Divergent recommendations signal breaking up of the 
pair which causes negative returns. The pairs do not evidence expected relative post-
recommendations drift in the direction recommendations indicate and hence the direction of 
recommendations does not give information on the future direction of the spread between a 
stock pair. Table 12 summarizes results on the studied hypotheses. 
 
Table 12 
Summary of hypotheses 
H1: Statistical pairs trading generates positive abnormal returns.   Accepted 
H2: Analysts’ relative recommendations have investment value.  Accepted 
H3a: Pairs trades opened after announcement of divergent recommendations yield 
abnormal negative returns. 
 Rejected 
H3b: Pairs trades that receive divergent recommendations in the direction to widen the 
spread after the trade is opened yield abnormal negative returns. 
 Accepted 
H3c: Pairs trades that receive divergent recommendations in the direction to narrow the 
spread after the trade is opened yield abnormal positive returns. 
  Rejected 
 
 
H3a and H3c are rejected because the post-recommendations drift is not found significant. H3b 
is accepted and pairs trades that receive divergent recommendations in the direction to widen 
the spread after the trade is opened are the main cause for the negative return to trades 
connected to divergent recommendations. The negative return is not due to significant post-
recommendations drift, however, but due to significant unexplained negative return to the 
trade before the issue of divergent recommendations. 
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I study recommendations as information intermediaries to which stock markets react to. In 
parts of my results it is evident that analysts’ recommendations reflect information that the 
stock markets have reacted to already before the recommendations are announced. Hence, the 
post-recommendations stock price drift is also small or nonexistent. 
 
In aggregate, trades connected to divergent recommendations yield negative return due to 
high number of pairs breaking up. The abnormal positive return to statistical pairs trading is 
produced in its entirety by pairs that are not issued divergent recommendations. When pairs 
trading on convergence of the pair, an investor should not trade a spread that opens after 
announcement of divergent recommendations and correspondingly an open trade that is 
issued divergent recommendations should be closed immediately. 
 
My results do not explain the irrational post-recommendations movement of the spread 
between stocks forming a pair. If analysts issue recommendations based on other public 
information, studies on the content of the original news could find reasons, why markets react 
differently to divergent recommendations in stock pairs than analysts expect.  
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